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ABSTRACT

More than half of all Americans live in areas that violate at least one of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency’s air quality standards for ground-level ozone and fine
particulate matter. The majority of these areas have many options to come into
compliance with the standards, such as requiring vehicle inspection/maintenance
programs, changing gasoline blends, and requiring additional controls on power plants.
Chapter 1 explores the use of conjoint-based choice experiments to assist local
policymakers in determining the most beneficial policy strategy using the case study of
Knoxville, Tennessee. Given that different policy actions pass costs onto households in
different ways and that households may have varying preferences regarding how they pay
those costs, I test whether willingness to pay for air quality improvements is sensitive to
the method of payment. Potential heterogeneity of preferences is modeled through a
mixed logit specification. Results indicate positive willingness to pay among Knoxville
area residents for improvements in air quality, with vehicle inspection and an increase in
the price of gasoline as the preferred payment vehicles over an increase in the electricity
bill.
Chapter 2 investigates the underlying incentive compatibility of choice
experiments with tests of the mechanism in an induced value laboratory setting. The
theoretical properties of both dichotomous choice and trichotomous choice elicitation
formats are explored under plurality voting rules and more generally under the
assumption that the respondent perceives her decision to have some influence on the
outcome. Results indicate that certain belief structures can lead to incentive compatible
iv

outcomes in a trichotomous choice format, depending on how a respondent believes the
agency will incorporate respondent decisions into the provision of a public good. In
addition, the trichotomous choice treatments had fewer deviations from theory and were
less subject to status quo bias than treatments with dichotomous choice questions.
Implications for the design of choice experiments and contingent valuation surveys are
discussed.
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CHAPTER 1: VALUING AIR QUALITY POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE
KNOXVILLE METROPOLITAN AREA
1.1 Introduction

More than half of all Americans live in areas where air pollution violates the
standards put forth by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).1 The two most
pervasive ambient air pollutants are ground-level ozone and fine particulate matter, which
are linked to increased incidences of respiratory and cardiopulmonary disease. While the
federal government has taken some actions that will mitigate pollution problems
nationwide, local policymakers in areas characterized by higher levels of pollution must
also take incremental actions to ensure compliance with federal laws governing air
quality.
In many areas of the country, policymakers have a great degree of flexibility in
choosing emission reduction measures. In areas where several options to meet air quality
standards are available, a decision must be made as to which measure, or combination of
measures, would achieve air quality standards. A mechanism particularly suited to
informing the policy choice from the menu of options is the stated-choice method of
choice experiments (CE). Based on conjoint analysis, this method has been used to value
environmental amenities since the 1990s, but has been used extensively in the marketing
and transportation literature to derive relative values of a good’s constituent attributes
(hence the name conjoint, for “considered jointly”).

1

U.S. EPA Greenbook of Nonattainment Areas
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The conjoint approach was used to estimate the willingness to pay of households
in the Knoxville, Tennessee area for improved air quality. Surveys were collected from
over 400 individuals representing households in this area to provide the data needed to
generate estimates of willingness to pay for air quality improvements. Due to a
combination of topographic conditions, proximity to coal-fired power plants, an increase
in population and vehicle miles traveled, and the convergence of major trucking routes (I75, I-40, and I-81), the Knoxville area2 was found to be in violation with both the ozone
and fine particulate matter standards in 2004.
The results of this study demonstrate how choice experiments can assess potential
welfare impacts to households from various policy options to reduce both ozone and fine
particulate matter emissions and, thus, inform the policy debate. Because the Knoxville
area is considered by the EPA to be a basic nonattainment area, it has more flexibility in
determining which actions to undertake to meet EPA standards. 3 Myriad combinations of
policy actions can be utilized to meet the air quality standards, each having differing
impacts on households in terms of cost, method of payment, and effect on health and
visibility of scenic views. An important input to the policy process is an increased
understanding of the value households place on different policy attributes and the welfare
change associated with a particular policy strategy. Candidate models for analyzing the
survey data include multinomial logit, nested logit, and mixed logit. The preferred model

2

The Knoxville area designated nonattainment for ozone consists of counties belonging to its MSA
(Anderson, Blount, Knox, Loudon, and Sevier), as well as neighboring Jefferson County and Cocke County
(partial). Anderson, Blount, Knox, Loudon, and Roane (partial) counties were designated nonattainment
for particulate matter.
3
Basic nonattainment areas are those areas that are in violation of the 8-hour ozone standard but are in
attainment with the previous 1-hour ozone standard of 0.12 ppm. Fewer prescriptive actions are required of
these areas than those areas with more severe pollution problems.

2

is mixed logit, which provides a greater degree of behavioral realism for discrete choice
data with its flexibility in modeling substitution patterns across alternatives and its ability
to account for multiple choice situations for each respondent.4 The survey design and
analysis also permit consideration of an important methodological question – does the
method of payment for air quality benefits affect willingness to pay?
The analysis indicates that households would be willing to pay for visibility and
health improvements, with magnitudes depending on the method of payment (i.e.,
whether it is through a mandatory inspection and maintenance program for vehicles, an
increase in the monthly electricity bill, or an increase in the price of gasoline).

1.2 Air Quality Policy

Under the Clean Air Act, states must achieve attainment of National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS) for six criteria pollutants – sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen
oxide (NO), lead (PB), carbon monoxide (CO), coarse and fine particulate matter (PM10
and PM2.5), and ground-level ozone (O3). The EPA sets primary standards to protect
public health and secondary standards to protect public welfare, which includes
impairment of scenic views and damage to animals, crops, vegetation, and buildings. To
assess compliance, the EPA requires states to monitor emissions and compares reported
emissions with the pollutant’s allowable concentration. If an area fails to meet pollutant
standards, the state must develop within three years a separate State Implementation Plan

4

The assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives implicit in the multinomial logit model was
violated in this application.

3

(SIP) for each pollutant detailing how the state intends to come into attainment. An area
that is deemed “nonattainment” with EPA standards potentially faces economic penalties
in the form of costly emission controls, emission offsets from new polluting sources,
conformity of the area’s transportation plan to its SIP, and the potential loss of highway
funds. The degree of these economic penalties depends on the severity of
nonattainment.5
Standards for ground-level ozone and fine particulate matter were revised in 1997
due to new scientific research indicating that previous standards were not sufficient to
protect public health.6 Industry-led litigation delayed implementation of the new
standards until the Supreme Court upheld EPA’s authority in 2002. Cleared of legal
hurdles, the EPA made attainment designations for ozone and fine particulate matter in
2004. A total of 474 counties with 159 million people were found to be in nonattainment
5

If the state fails to submit or implement a SIP, or the EPA deems the SIP inadequate, a “sanctions clock”
is set to prompt the state to remedy its deficiencies. If the SIP has not been corrected within 18 months, the
EPA may impose offset requirements for new emission sources and existing sources undergoing
modification that mandate up to 2:1 emission reductions. If the state has still not submitted an adequate
SIP within six months of the offset requirements, federal highway funds could be revoked unless the funds
are used for projects that improve air quality or safety. An area could also lose its highway funds if
metropolitan planning officials create a Transportation Improvement Plan (TIP) that does not conform to
the air quality State Implementation Plan. Finally, if an area continues to fail to meet its SIP obligations,
the EPA can create its own implementation plan for the area, called a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP).
6
In July 1997, EPA promulgated the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Fine Particles (PM2.5)
and for Ground-level Ozone (O3) (USEPA, 1997a and 1997b). The revised particulate matter standards
added a standard for fine particles (PM2.5) and strengthened the standard for coarse particles (PM10). The
annual fine particle standard is a level of 15 micrograms per cubic meter, based on the 3-year average of
annual mean PM2.5 concentrations. The 24-hour fine particle standard is a level of 65 micrograms per cubic
meter, based on the 3-year average of the 98th percentile of 24-hour concentrations. The annual coarse
particle standard is a level of 50 micrograms per cubic meter, based on the 3-year average of annual mean
PM10 concentrations. The 24-hour coarse particle standard is a level of 150 micrograms per cubic meter,
not to be exceeded more than once per year. The 8-hour ozone standard is a level of 0.08 parts per million
(ppm), based on the 3-year average of the 4th highest concentration averaged over an 8-hour period. The
previous ozone standard was 0.125 ppm averaged over one hour, based on the 4th highest concentration
during a 3-year period.
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with ozone, and 224 counties with 95 million people were found to be in nonattainment
with particulate matter (see Figure 1.1).
The EPA classifies ozone nonattainment areas by the degree of violation of the
standard. The classifications (basic, marginal, moderate, serious, severe and extreme)
specify how much flexibility an area has in devising measures to attain the standard, as
well as the length of time it is allowed to come into attainment. Of areas in ozone
nonattainment, 172 counties with approximately 43 million people are considered “basic”
while an additional 80 counties with 21.5 million people live in areas that are considered
“marginal.” General requirements of basic and marginal areas include reasonably
available control technologies (RACT) applied to existing sources emitting more than
100 tons per year of ozone precursors and reasonable further progress towards
attainment, all to be detailed in the SIP. Other requirements to ensure that sources do not
worsen air quality or interfere with meeting air quality standards include transportation
conformity, new source review permitting procedures, and emission offsets. These areas
also have a relatively short time span to reach attainment (generally two years upon
submission of the SIP). Areas in more severe violation of the ozone standard may have
specific measures prescribed for them by the EPA such as a vehicle inspection and
maintenance program, reformulated gasoline, stricter emission offsets, vapor controls at
gasoline stations, and more emission sources subject to RACT (USEPA, 1997b). The
proposed implementation rule for fine particulate matter indicates that the EPA would
prefer not to have a classification system for this pollutant, but rather allow areas
flexibility to meet the standard in a similar fashion as to what is required for basic and
marginal ozone nonattainment areas (USEPA, 2005).
5

Figure 1.1: Nonattainment Counties
Source: EPA Greenbook of Nonattainment Areas
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1.2.1 Health Effects of Ground-level Ozone and Fine Particulate Matter
Ground-level ozone is formed when nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic
compounds (VOCs) react in the presence of sunlight, with higher levels typically
occurring between May and October. Nitrogen oxides are emitted from motor vehicles,
power plants, industrial boilers, cement kilns and other sources of combustion (e.g.,
construction, aircraft, farming, and recreation equipment), and can be transported
hundreds of miles by prevailing winds. Volatile organic compounds such as
hydrocarbons occur naturally and are also emitted from motor vehicles, chemical plants,
refineries, factories, consumer and commercial products, and industrial sources. Ozone
acts as a respiratory irritant, with short-term exposure leading to wheezing and coughing,
shortness of breath, and chest pain (USEPA, 1999). Long-term exposure has been linked
with reduced lung function, inflammation of the lung lining and increased respiratory
discomfort (Kunzli et al, 1997). Populations most susceptible to the effects of ozone are
children, the elderly, those who have compromised immune systems, and those who
spend a lot of time working or exercising outdoors (Desqueyroux et al, 2002; Hoppe et al,
2003; Deflino et al, 1998, Kinney and Lippmann, 2000; Peters et al, 1999; Thurston et al,
1997).
Fine particles less than 2.5 microns in diameter (PM2.5) result from fuel
combustion from motor vehicles, power generation, and industrial facilities, as well as
from residential fireplaces and wood stoves. Coarse particles (PM10) are generally
emitted from vehicles traveling on unpaved roads, materials handling, crushing and
grinding operations, and windblown dust. Particles can be emitted directly or can be
secondarily formed by atmospheric processes that chemically transform gases to sulfates
7

and nitrates. Haze-producing sulfate particles, formed by the chemical reaction of sulfur
dioxide (SO2) in the atmosphere, account for 50 to 70 percent of the visibility reduction
in the eastern part of the United States (USEPA, 2007). Major sources of particulate
matter include SO2 emissions from power plants and diesel exhaust. Exposure to coarse
particles is primarily associated with the aggravation of respiratory conditions, such as
asthma (USEPA, 2000). Fine particles are most closely associated with such health
effects as increased hospital admissions and emergency room visits for heart and lung
disease, increased respiratory symptoms and disease, decreased lung function, and
premature death (Krewski et al, 2000; Pope et al, 2002). As with ozone pollution,
prevailing winds can transport fine particle pollution hundreds of miles (coarse particles
tend to fall relatively close to the emission source). Populations at risk include the
elderly, individuals with pre-existing conditions such as cardiopulmonary disease, and
children (USEPA, 1997a).

1.2.2 Case Study: Knoxville, Tennessee
As noted above, a convergence of factors contributes to Knoxville’s violation of
air quality standards. The three primary culprits are proximity to coal-fired power plants
operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority, three heavily used interstate highways
passing through the area (I-40, I-75 and I-81), and the bowl-shaped topography of the
area that concentrates and traps air pollutants. Knoxville is surrounded by the
Cumberland Plateau and the Great Smoky Mountains National Park (GSMNP), which
was named the most polluted national park in 2002 (National Parks Conservation
Association, 2004). According to the National Park Service, annual average visibility at
8

GSMNP is 25 miles, compared to natural conditions of 93 miles. During severe haze
episodes, visibility has been reduced to less than one mile (National Parks Service, 2001).
Knox County was first deemed nonattainment for ground-level ozone following
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.7 Arguing that no violations of the standard
occurred between 1989 and 1991, Knox County successfully petitioned the EPA to redesignate it in attainment with air quality standards, and became a “maintenance area” in
1991.8 Upon notification that the entire metropolitan area plus neighboring Jefferson
County was in danger of violating the new 8-hour ozone standard in 2002, the Knoxville
area voluntarily agreed to sign an Early Action Compact (EAC) with the EPA to reduce
emissions earlier than would be required after nonattainment designations were made in
2004. The EPA offered these compacts to areas that were in attainment with the old onehour ozone standard, but were projected to violate the new, stricter 8-hour standard. In
return for earlier emission reductions, the area could avoid nonattainment status and its
attendant penalties. Local officials submitted the required Air Quality Improvement Plan
to the EPA in March 2004, which proposed such emission reduction actions as a lower
speed limit on rural interstates, truck stop electrification, cetane additives to diesel fuel,
and a ban on open burning. Of about 30 EAC submissions nationwide, the EPA only
rejected three areas as insufficient: Knoxville, Chattanooga, and Memphis (all Tennessee

7

The ozone standard in 1990 was 0.120 ppm, averaged over one-hour, with violations occurring if the 4th
highest concentration over the previous three year period exceeded this value.
8
Requirements of maintenance areas include a prevention of significant deterioration permitting program
and contingency measures to ensure compliance with the ozone standard for at least ten years following redesignation to attainment. Elements of Knox County’s maintenance plan included modeling emissions
growth, requiring fuel with reid vapor pressure of 9.0 pounds per square inch, and installing RACT on
major sources of emissions.
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areas), subjecting them to full nonattainment status.9
The Knoxville area officially became a nonattainment area for ozone and fine
particulate matter in June 2004 and December 2004, respectively. The area was given
two years to create the state implementation plans detailing how it will achieve
attainment, and is required to meet the ozone and fine particulate matter standards by
2009 and 2010, respectively. The choice experiment application to this area
demonstrates how this method can benefit policymakers by estimating the relative public
support, in terms of willingness to pay, for various emission reduction measures and
payment vehicles.

1.3 Methodology

1.3.1 Valuing Nonmarket Goods
Environmental economists attempt to estimate both use and non-use values for
environmental goods and services that are not priced in the marketplace. Use values arise
from directly consuming the environmental good, such as rock-climbing in a national
park or enjoying scenic views. Non-use values do not stem from current use of the good,
but are rather derived from having the option to use the good in the future (“option
value”), to allow future generations to consume the good (“bequest value”), or to know
that the environmental good exists (“existence value”). An example of existence value is
the utility that an individual derives from knowing that the Arctic National Wildlife

9

Chattanooga subsequently revised its early action plan to include vehicle inspection/maintenance, and was
allowed to remain an EAC.
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Refuge is preserved, even if that individual never intends to visit the refuge personally.
Stated preference methods are survey-based methods used to estimate willingness to pay
for an environmental improvement, and can estimate both use and non-use values. The
most common type of stated preference method to value environmental amenities is
contingent valuation (CV), where respondents are given information regarding a
proposed improvement to the good and asked a question to gauge willingness to pay to
realize this change. Willingness to pay can be expressed by a variety of payment
vehicles, such as an increase in income taxes, a one-time charge, a user tax, an increase in
the price of a particular good, etc. The payment elicitation mechanism can also vary.
Initial applications of the method asked open-ended willingness to pay (e.g., “How much
would you be willing to pay to provide this hiking trail?”), while more recent applications
typically ask a dichotomous choice question (e.g., “Would you be willing to pay $x to
provide this hiking trail? Please circle yes or no.”) The first contingent valuation study
was conducted by Davis (1963) to estimate the value of big game hunting in Maine.
After a study of the Four Corners region in 1974 by Randall, Ives, and Eastman, CV was
recognized as providing a measure of Hicksian surplus arising from the provision of
public goods.10
Because stated preference methods utilize hypothetical markets where payment
may not actually take place, the analyst must bear in mind several potential types of
biases that could arise, and take the appropriate steps to correct for them. Respondents,
knowing that their answers could influence policy, may not provide their true willingness

10

Use of the CV method for policy analysis was affirmed by Federal Court in State of Ohio v. U.S.
Department of the Interior, 880 F. 2nd, 474.
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to pay for a public good when payment is not required. Other sorts of biases that may
drive a wedge between actual and stated willingness to pay include interviewer bias (if
the study is conducted face-to-face), yea-saying (the respondent feels compelled to
provide the response he or she feels is “correct”), embedding/scope effects (the
respondent’s willingness to pay is invariant to different quantities of the good), or
hypothetical bias (knowing that the exercise is only a survey, the respondent may not take
the task seriously). Because the respondent is not actually observed making the payment
in the marketplace to obtain the good, doubts have been cast regarding this method’s
validity in obtaining unbiased estimates of willingness to pay (Diamond and Hausman,
1994). Numerous refinements of the CV method have continued over the past 30 years to
improve its reliability as a valid means of measuring welfare by improving survey design
and implementation (Mitchell and Carson, 1989). General conclusions are that
respondents should be cognizant of the relevant attributes of the good, the proposed
change in the good (including details of the status quo), what exactly they are asked to
value, the acceptability of giving a ‘no’ response, how the change in provision of the
good will be achieved in a plausible manner, the degree of certainty regarding both the
changed scenario and the status quo, and the distribution of the good (Hanemann, 1994).
CV began to be used in the legal arena as the basis of natural resource damage
claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA) of 1980, and was most famously used to assess non-use damages arising
from the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 (Ward and Duffield, 1992). The National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) commissioned a blue ribbon panel to
evaluate the credibility of using CV to estimate nonuse values in 1993, and provided
12

specific recommendations to improve its reliability such as the use of dichotomous choice
as the elicitation mechanism (NOAA 1993). The general consensus of the literature is
that stated preference methods should not be considered unreliable simply because they
are based on a hypothetical market, but that reliability is a function of survey design and
implementation. Furthermore, if one believes non-use values should be relevant to
policymaking decisions, stated preference methods provide the only means of capturing
them. Further discussion of the incentive compatibility of stated preference methods will
be presented in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

1.3.2 Choice Experiments
In the 1990s environmental economists began exploring choice experiments as an
alternative to contingent valuation in valuing environmental amenities. Choice
experiments are based on the assumption that individuals derive utility not from a good
itself, but from its constituent attributes (Lancaster, 1966). For example, an individual
does not derive utility from a car per se, but from its color, fuel economy, seat material,
power, design, price, etc. The technique, developed by Louviere and Hensher (1982) and
Louviere and Woodworth (1983), consists of presenting respondents with a choice set of
options comprised of attributes with varying levels, and elicits the most preferred option
from the choice set. In this way choice experiments are similar to real world purchase
decisions where consumers are presented with a variety of goods characterized by
different attribute levels and choose whatever gives them the most satisfaction. To
identify relative attribute values several questions are asked per application. This method
has been used extensively in the marketing and transportation literature to derive the
13

relative values of a good’s constituent attributes. Environmental applications of this
technique include the valuation of rivers (Morrison and Bennett, 2004), global warming
mitigation options (Layton and Brown, 2000), remnant vegetation (Blamey et al, 2000),
water supply options (Blamey et al, 1999), polluted beaches and rivers (Garrod and
Willis, 1999), caribou habitat (Adamowicz et al, 1998), and freshwater recreation
(Adamowicz et al, 1994). Like contingent valuation, this method can estimate use as
well as non-use values.
Choice experiments are based on random utility theory (Luce, 1959 and
McFadden, 1973), where the utility derived by individual n from option j, denoted U nj
below, is posited to have a deterministic component Vnj that can be explained by the
analyst and an unobservable, stochastic component, enj :
U nj = Vnj + enj

Unlike conventional demand theory, an assumption must be made about the
distribution of the error term e in order to make predictions from the theory (Bateman et
al, 2002). According to random utility theory, an individual, when faced with alternative
options, will choose that option that gives the highest level of utility. The error term
captures the analyst’s uncertainty about an individual’s utility function.
The probability that option j will be selected by individual n from his available
choice set can be modeled as the probability that the difference between the systematic
components of utility between choice j and any alternative l in the choice set is greater
than the difference between the random components:
Pr[(Vnj + e nj ) > (Vnl + enl )] = Pr[(V nj − Vnl ) > (enj − enl )] . A common practice has been to

14

assume that the errors are independently and identically distributed (iid) extreme value.
This assumption results in the conditional logit specification that requires the
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The IIA property implies that the addition
or change of an alternative does not change the relative probability of selection between
any other alternatives. Substitution between alternatives is subsequently restricted to
proportionate shifting, which is often not consistent with expectations.11 If IIA does not
hold, parameter estimates are biased. Methods to address IIA include adding
socioeconomic and attitudinal variables to the model (Bennett et al, 2001a) or by
analyzing choice data with the more general nested logit and mixed logit models.
In a typical choice experiment application, the analyst creates choice sets of
options that differ by the levels of their constituent attributes. For example, if each
choice set consisted of three options where each option i is described by a vector of
attributes X i , the explained portion of utility for each option could be modeled as:
Option 1: V1 = ASC1 + β ' X 1

Option 2: V2 = ASC 2 + β ' X 2
Option 3 (baseline): V3 = β ' X 3
ASC1 and ASC2 are alternative specific constants for the options other than the constant
baseline (Option 3), and serve to capture systematic but unobserved information
11

Consider the classic “red bus, blue bus” example: Suppose an individual can either drive a car to work or
take a red bus, and derives equal utility from either option so that the probability of either transportation
mode is ½. Now assume that a blue bus service is offered, which is exactly the same as the red bus except
for its color. The probability that the individual will take the red bus will therefore be the same as taking
the blue bus. Because the multinomial logit model requires that the relative probability between driving a
car and taking the red bus remain the same, the model predicts that the probability of each mode becomes
1/3. However, we would expect that the addition of the blue bus would not affect the probability of taking
the car, and would simply split the probability of taking the red bus: prob(car) = ½ and prob (red bus) =
prob (blue bus) = ¼.
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regarding the choice of a particular option. Whether the alternative specific constants
should be estimated separately for each option is an empirical question. Bennett et al
(2001a) suggest that if the options are labeled across the choice sets (for example, by the
overall policy effect of the bundle of attributes), ASC1 and ASC2 should be estimated
separately. If, on the other hand, options are generic and do not signal any information
about the alternative (e.g., simply labeled “Option 1” and “Option 2”), then the ASCs
could be constrained to be equal. Socioeconomic and attitudinal variables can also be
included in these equations, but only as interactions with either the ASCs or the attributes
since they do not vary across options in a choice set. An advantage of choice
experiments is the degree of experimental control held by the analyst in determining the
range of attribute levels, which may or may not be currently experienced.
Marginal rates of substitution can be calculated for any two attributes by dividing
their respective coefficients: MRS mk = −

βm
. If β k is the coefficient of the payment
βk

variable, this calculation provides an estimate of the marginal willingness to pay for the
attribute.12
If one option is held constant over all choice sets, welfare measures can be
calculated from the baseline (typically the status quo) to any state that can be created
from the range of levels employed in the model. Consequently, CE allows ranking of
different alternatives, which assists policymakers by providing estimates of public
support over competing options. The typical welfare measure calculated from a choice
experiment application is compensating surplus, which defines how much money must be
12

In the discrete choice literature marginal willingness to pay is also referred to as the “implicit price” of an
attribute.
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taken away from an individual after receiving an environmental improvement to make
him as well off as before the change in environmental quality. Compensating surplus is
therefore a measure of total willingness to pay for improvements in environmental quality
(e.g., an increase in the visibility of scenic vistas). Hanemann (1984) calculated
compensating surplus as:
CS =

1
− β payment

1
  J0 Vj0 
 J V j1  
ln ∑ e  − ln ∑ e  
  j =1

 j =1
 

where V 0 represents utility associated before the change in option(s) j, V 1 represents
utility associated after the change in attribute levels, and β payment is the coefficient of the
payment variable. J 0 and J 1 represent the number of options before and after the
change, respectively. If welfare is being calculated from one state of the world to
another, the formula reduces to:
CS =

V 0 −V 1
− β payment

The negative of the payment coefficient represents the marginal utility of income since it
provides how much utility is increased when the cost of an option decreases by one
dollar. In order to apply this formula for willingness to pay, marginal utility of income
must be held constant. While this is clearly an unrealistic assumption for all income
levels, it may be reasonable over the range of policy outcomes.
Relatively few studies have been conducted to test if choice experiments can
result in respondents revealing their true preferences. Concern has been raised over the
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validity of this method because it does not contain an explicit provision rule (nor is one
easily inferred) that maps how respondent choices will influence the policy outcome
(e.g., a majority-rule referendum) and requires respondents to answer multiple questions
where they choose one option from three or more alternatives. It is well known that any
mechanism other than a binary response cannot be incentive compatible without
restricting agent preferences (Gibbard, 1973 and Satterthwaite, 1975). Chapter 2 of the
dissertation examines different preference structures under which the method can provide
incentive compatible outcomes.
Most studies examining the incentive properties of choice experiments look for
evidence of hypothetical bias where perceived response incentives may deviate from
those in an analogous situation with direct financial implications.13 Carlsson and
Martinsson (2001) test for hypothetical bias using donations for environmental projects,
and find no differences between actual and hypothetical marginal willingness to pay.
Lusk and Schroeder (2004) find that hypothetical choices overestimate total willingness
to pay for a private good, beef steaks, but that marginal willingness to pay for a change in
steak quality is generally not significantly different across hypothetical and actual
settings. Carlsson et al (2006) find that the estimated marginal willingness to pay for
food is significantly lower when a cheap talk script is used in the survey instrument.14
List et al (2006) find no evidence of hypothetical bias (with or without cheap talk) in a
study estimating the marginal willingness to pay for attributes of a private good (Nolan
13

A concern here is whether the hypothetical instrument used in these tests satisfies Carson, Groves, and
Machina’s (2000) requirement of consequentiality for a survey to be incentive compatible. This issue is
addressed in Chapter 2 of the dissertation.
14
Cheap talk refers to providing survey recipients with information regarding the tendency of overstating
willingness to pay in a survey format. This script is provided before respondents are asked their
willingness to pay.
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Ryan baseball cards). In addition, they find that responses elicited for the provision of a
public good (contributions to the University of Central Florida’s Center for
Environmental Policy Analysis) were not significantly different between real and
hypothetical cheap talk treatments, although subjects were more likely to donate if the
treatment were hypothetical without cheap talk.
Two studies of choice experiments have been conducted in a classroom setting.
Boyle et al (2006) seek to explain the discrepancy of value estimates between choice
experiments15 and contingent valuation by examining various provision rules. They
describe three provision rule treatments: an individual provision rule that implements for
a specific individual the option that he chose, a group provision rule that implements the
option receiving the most support regardless if it was chosen by a particular subject, and
no provision rule that is intended to mimic field applications of choice experiments.
Their results suggest that the inclusion of the individual provision rule significantly
reduces the number of subjects who opt-in to the market for a private good, T-shirts,
relative to the group provision rule and no provision rule treatments. In valuing a realworld public good, a local non-profit organization called Trees Atlanta that plants trees in
the Atlanta metro area, they find that the group provision rule and no provision rule
treatments yield higher marginal values than either the real or hypothetical individual
provision rule treatments. The only test of the incentive compatibility of choice
experiments using induced values in a lab setting is concurrent research by Carson et al
(2006). They test if the rate of non-demand revealing responses significantly differs

15

In their paper, as elsewhere in the discrete choice literature, choice experiments is referred to as “choice
modeling.” Choice experiments have also been referred to as conjoint-based choice experiments.
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across elicitation formats that vary by the number of options (dichotomous choice vs.
multiple choice) and the number of choice sets (single vs. repeated). They find that while
the frequency of violations of the independence of irrelevant alternatives in the multiple
choice treatments are not significant, the rate of non-demand revelation in the repeated
multiple choice treatment is significantly higher than in the repeated dichotomous choice
treatment.

1.4 Application

1.4.1 Description of Policy Attributes
A survey was designed to elicit household preferences over different policy
options to meet regional air quality standards. Because the survey was designed to be
administered to households, the attributes of different policy options (the benefits and
costs) were those determined most salient to this population. Benefits include both the
increase in average visibility and the number of healthy days per year (healthy days are
defined as days the area is not violating any air quality standard). Potential costs of
achieving air quality improvements include increases in the costs of gasoline, electricity,
and the costs of complying with a vehicle inspection/maintenance program. To be
consistent with welfare theory, attribute levels are defined as changes relative to the
status quo. In this application (as in Blamey et al, 2000), the status quo consists of the
level of benefits if no additional local action is taken. While households would incur no
direct costs under the status quo, the area would remain in violation of EPA standards and
be subject to costly industry and transportation controls. Due to actions already taken at
20

the federal level regarding power plant emissions and a combination of engine and fuel
standards, some improvement in visibility and the number of healthy days will already
occur without local action (although not sufficient to bring the area into attainment).
In addition to determining relative values for environmental and health attributes,
this study also considers the impact of differing payment vehicles. Typically choice
experiments only employ one payment attribute (usually an unspecified, general tax to
the respondent), but a more comprehensive treatment of this variable seems warranted for
policy analysis as different policy alternatives equate to different methods of payment. A
key component of this research will be to test whether elicited willingness to pay is
sensitive to the method of payment.
Attribute levels encompass the potential range of policy actions (see Table 1.1).
According to the EPA’s AirData database, the Knoxville area averaged 40 unhealthy air
quality days per year from 1999-2003.16 Levels of this attribute are specified as
improvements from this baseline (e.g., an increase of 32 healthy days). Similarly,
average annual visibility levels are expressed as improvements over the current baseline
of 25 miles (e.g., an increase in visibility of 7 miles). On the cost side, an
inspection/maintenance program is described as requiring households to spend $20 per
year to test each vehicle, with an average repair cost of $150 for a failing vehicle
(Cummins, 2004). The levels derived for the choice sets included the testing fee of $20
and the repair cost averaged over the expected lifetime of the vehicle (assumed to be 5
years). According to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) officials, electricity rates could

16

Accessed at http://www.epa.gov/air/data/, updated September 26, 2006.
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Table 1.1 Policy Attributes and Levels
Attribute
Visibility improvement

Levels
1 mile
7 miles
15 miles

Healthy days improvement

16 days
24 days
32 days

Increase in cost of gasoline per gallon

0 cents
4 cents
8 cents

Increase in yearly electricity bill

$0
$72
$144

Vehicle inspection/maintenance cost per year

$0
$20
$50

increase up to 14% if TVA were required to spend at least $1 billion on additional
emissions controls such as scrubbers (Powelson, 2004). Because the average monthly
electricity bill for the area is approximately $85, the upper level for this attribute is an
increase of $144 per year. Several potential control measures could affect the price of
gasoline, such as requiring vapor recovery nozzles to capture evaporative emissions of
VOCs or mandating the use of reformulated and/or lower volatility gasoline. Vapor
controls and lower volatility gasoline would each cost approximately 2 cents extra per
gallon (USEPA, 1991; Energy Information Administration, 1999), while reformulated
gasoline would cost 5 – 8 cents extra per gallon (USEPA, 1999b). Because of the lack of
knowledge regarding the respondent’s expenditure on gasoline per year, the cost of
gasoline was expressed as the increase in cents per gallon in the choice set. Examples
22

were given in the survey to translate the price increase per gallon into yearly costs to the
household by calculating the cost of a small car averaging 22 miles per gallon and driven
12,000 miles per year and the cost of driving a large car averaging 12 miles per gallon
and driven 12,000 miles per year.

1.4.2 Experimental Design
The series of choice sets were created by using a fractional factorial design, where
levels of attributes were varied in a systematic way to efficiently estimate the parameters
of the model with the fewest choice sets per respondent. With five attributes having three
levels each, and for each choice set that contains two varying policy bundles and one
bundle fixed at status quo levels, the total factorial design that gives all possible
combinations of alternatives results in 35*2 = 59,049 combinations. Obviously
respondents cannot be expected to face that many choice alternatives, so a fractional
factorial design must be used that finds the smallest number of combinations that still
enables statistical identification of the attributes. While fractional factorial designs can
estimate the direct independent effects (also known as “main effects”) of the attributes on
choice selection, they cannot estimate the impact of attribute interactions. For example,
preferences for the number of healthy days per year must be assumed to be independent
of the level of visibility. This tradeoff is acceptable considering that main effects account
for between 70 and 90 percent of explained variance (Louviere, 2000).
A fractional factorial of 18 choice sets was created using the D-efficiency
criterion in SAS that minimizes the variance matrix of the nonlinear choice model
(Kuhfeld, 2003). The SAS procedure selects alternatives from the full factorial and
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compares efficiency across 100 different experimental designs. Maximizing D-efficiency
results in a design with the smallest possible errors around the estimated parameters. The
SAS code is presented in Appendix A. To further reduce the cognitive burden to
respondents, this design was blocked into three survey versions of six choice sets. The
resulting combinations of attribute levels were constrained to represent plausible
scenarios to respondents. For example, visibility could not improve from the status quo
level if there were no increases in the monthly electricity bill since visibility
improvement is primarily a function of power plant emissions of sulfur dioxide.
Dominated alternatives were also discarded.

1.4.3 Survey Design and Sample
Surveys were designed following suggestions from the Dillman Total Design
Method (Dillman, 2000). For example, the survey cover design consisted of a map of the
relevant sample area, cover letters to the respondent were personalized and individually
signed, regular postage stamps were used on all envelopes, reminder post-cards were
mailed a week after the survey. An incentive to respond was provided by including an
optional raffle form to win one of ten $50 gift cards to Wal-Mart from a random drawing.
Respondents were informed that survey results would be considered as an input into the
policymaking process and that their individual responses would remain confidential.
Background information on current air quality in the Knoxville area was provided, as
well as an example of a choice set, presented below in Figure 1.2. Choice sets
constructed from the experimental design were then presented for the respondents to
select preferred options, followed by questions on socioeconomic status and attitudes
24

Sample Question: Suppose the following three policies were the only options
available for achieving air quality goals in the Knoxville metro area. Please indicate
which policy you prefer by checking one of the boxes below.
Local Policy A

Local Policy B

Policy Benefits and Costs

Policy C:
No Local Action

Visibility improvement

1 mile

7 miles

1 mile

Healthy days improvement

32 days

16 days

16 days

Gasoline price increase per gallon

0 cents

8 cents

0 cents

Vehicle inspection cost per year

$50

$20

$0

Increase in electric bill per year

$144

$72

$0

Policy A

I would choose:

Policy B

Policy C

If you choose Policy A, you are indicating that you would prefer the policy with these
outcomes:
•
•
•
•
•

Visibility improvement: 1 mile. Under this policy option, average annual
visibility would improve from 25 miles to 26 miles.
Healthy days improvement: 32. Under this policy option, the number of healthy
days would improve by 32 days. Instead of 40 unhealthy days per year, there
would only be 8 unhealthy days per year on average.
Gasoline price increase per gallon: 0 cents. This policy option does not include
changes to gasoline, so gasoline prices would be unchanged.
Vehicle inspection cost per year: $50. Emissions testing is a part of this policy
option. The cost represents the testing fee ($20) plus the average payment if a
vehicle fails inspection, spread out over a five-year lifetime of the vehicle ($30).
Increase in electric bill per year: $144. This policy option would require power
plants to install additional equipment, and lead to electricity price increases of $12
per month, or $144 per year.

Policy B has a similar interpretation, while Policy C represents the “No Local Action”
scenario where benefits occur because of actions already taken at the Federal level. For
this reason Policy C has no new costs to households, but the area may lose future
business development as a result of violating air quality standards.

Figure 1.2: Example of Choice Set
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toward the environment. Socioeconomic variables included age, gender, income,
education, vehicle ownership, and occurrence of asthma in family or friends. Attitudinal
variables included membership in an environmental organization, whether or not the
respondent had read news articles about local air quality during the previous year, if the
respondent believed the articles were accurate, etc. An example of the survey is included
in Appendix B.
The survey was mailed to a random sample of households living in the Knoxville
MSA and neighboring Jefferson County.17 Surveys were mailed to 2,400 households on
April 15, 2004, the day that EPA declared the area would formally receive a
nonattainment designation with respect to the ozone standard. Two hundred additional
surveys were mailed out in May to account for the high number of bad addresses in the
earlier sample. The overall response rate was approximately 18%, with 403 usable
surveys collected (after accounting for bad addresses, a total of 2,289 surveys were
actually delivered). Table 1.2 provides summary statistics of respondents. Compared
with information gathered from the 2000 U.S. Census for the Knoxville MSA, the
average respondent is older, more educated, and more likely to be male than the typical
individual living in the area.18 Family income is fairly comparable, averaging $44,800 in
the survey sample and $45,700 in the census. With such a low response rate, the problem
of sample selection must be investigated to determine if survey respondents have
fundamentally different preferences for air quality programs than the underlying
population. This issue is addressed in Appendix C.
17

The survey sample was obtained from Marc Publishing Company, which provides direct mailing and
telemarketing services.
18
According to the 2000 U.S. Census, the median age of the Knoxville MSA is 37.3, 76.5% of individuals
have less than a bachelor’s degree, and 48.4% of the population is male.
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Table 1.2 Summary Statistics
Variable

Sample mean
(std. dev.)

Age
50.32 (17.16)
Number of household members
2.55 (1.36)
Number of children under age 6
0.25 (0.63)
Number of household vehicles
2.48 (1.57)
Read news articles on Knoxville air
80.5 (39.6)
quality within past year (%)
Believed news articles on air quality
84.0(36.6)
to be accurate (%)
White (%)
90.9 (28.7)
Black (%)
5.1 (21.9)
Hispanic (%)
1.5 (12.2)
Asian (%)
1.8 (13.2)
Visited Smoky Mountain National
70.0 (45.8)
Park within last year (%)
Belong to an environmental
18.5 (38.8)
organization (%)
Household income ($)
44,800 (30,041)
Male (%)
55.3 (49.7)
Republican Party affiliation (%)
51.8 (50.0)
Democratic Party affiliation (%)
34.6 (47.6)
Married (%)
56.0 (49.6)
Household member with asthma (%)
24.8 (43.2)
Know someone in the area with
69.3 (46.1)
asthma (%)
Less than bachelor’s degree (%)
60.5 (48.9)
Monthly electricity bill ($)
125.47 (63.18)
Have lived in an area requiring
38.2 (48.6)
vehicle inspection (%)
Miles driven per year
15,177.0 (12,314.0)
Work fulltime (%)
53.1 (49.9)
Retired (%)
29.5 (45.6)
Student (%)
3.8 (19.1)
Data for the Knoxville MSA obtained from the 2000 U.S. Census.

27

Selected Data for the
Knoxville MSA
37.3 (median)
2.38
2.0

91.2
5.8
1.3
0.9

45,700
48.4
57.5

76.6

1.5. Model Specifications

1.5.1 Mixed Logit
The data is analyzed using a series of mixed logit models. The mixed logit model
is a generalization to the conditional logit model that allows some parameters to be
randomly distributed across households. This assumption relaxes the notion that all
individuals have the same preferences for a particular attribute, which is the case when a
parameter is assumed to be constant across the sample. McFadden and Train (2000) have
shown that any discrete choice model based on random utility maximization can be
represented by a mixed logit specification.
Following Train (2003), utility for individual n from alternative j can be
described in the mixed logit model as:

~
′
U nj = Vnj + ε nj = β n x nj + ε nj = x nj β + x nj β n + ε nj
~
where β n = β + β n

β n is a vector of individual-specific coefficients on observed policy- and individual~
specific variables, β represents the average preferences of the sample, and β n is the

stochastic deviation of the respondent’s tastes relative to average tastes in the sample.
Instead of being fixed over individuals, these coefficients vary over respondents with
density f ( β / θ ) where θ describes the underlying parameters of the distribution (i.e.,
mean and covariance). ε nj is a random term that is iid extreme value and independent of
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β n and x nj . If preferences for a particular attribute are expected to be homogeneous
~
across the sample, β n is simply assumed to be zero.

The unconditional probability of individual n choosing alternative j from a choice
set of K options is found by integrating the logit probability over the distribution of the
random parameters:
Pnj =

∫

e

V nj ( β )

∑ k =1 e Vnk ( β )
K

f (β / θ )d β

Because this probability yields no closed form solution, choice probabilities are
estimated by simulated maximum likelihood. This procedure entails estimating the mean
and covariance of f (β / θ ) , taking several draws of β from this density, calculating the
logit probability for each draw, and averaging over the number of draws.19 The simulated
probability is given by:
∨

P nj =

V (β )
1 T  e nj
∑
T t =1  ∑K e Vnk ( β )
 k =1






where T is the number of draws. The simulated probability approaches the population
probability as the number of draws increase. The simulated log-likelihood is therefore:
N

J

∨

SLL = ∑∑ d nj ln P nj
n −1 j −1

where dnj=1 if n chose j and dnj=0 otherwise.

19

A quasi-random maximum simulated likelihood method known as Halton draws are generally used in the
simulation. Halton draws use non-random sequences to improve accuracy and reduce computation time.
See Hensher and Greene (2003), Train (2003), and Train (1999) for the benefits of Halton number
sequences vs. random numbers.
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~
Since β n is common over each alternative for a given individual, the model

accounts for the panel structure of the data where the same respondent answers several
choice questions.20 This capability of the model is important since it is reasonable to
believe that choices made by the same individual will be influenced by common
unobservable factors. The model also relaxes the assumption of the independence of
irrelevant alternatives inherent in other logit models. Because the probability of choosing
a particular alternative involves the integration over the density of the parameters, the
ratio of probabilities for any two alternatives will depend on the attributes of all
alternatives in the choice set. Consequently, more realistic substitution patterns can be
generated in this model. For example, by assuming that the two action alternatives share
a common alternative specific constant, the model would predict that if one of the action
alternatives were dropped the probability of choosing the remaining action option would
rise proportionately more than the probability of choosing the status quo.
To create a mixed logit model, the analyst specifies a distribution for the variables
that are thought to vary across the sample, and also chooses which parameters should be
correlated, if any. Statistical significance of the estimated standard deviation of a random
parameter indicates that unobserved heterogeneity is present in the sample. Conversely,
if the estimated standard deviation is insignificant, preferences for the attribute can be
assumed to be homogeneous. If the parameter’s distribution can span both positive and
negative values, the proportion of the sample that obtains positive utility from the
attribute can be calculated from the estimated mean and standard deviation. When

20

A sequence of choices by the same individual is taken into account by simply including the product of
logit probabilities over an individual’s choice sets in the likelihood function.

30

specifying a parameter distribution, consideration should be given to the prior expectation
of a variable’s sign. For example, if a variable should be non-negative (i.e., a benefit
such as increase in the number of healthy days), the normal distribution may be
inappropriate since some proportion of the distribution could be negative.
The model for the Knoxville air quality application is defined over three options,
with two alternatives consisting of local action to improve air quality, and the third option
representing the status quo of no local action. An alternative specific constant is defined
to equal “1” for an alternative and “0” for the status quo. The deterministic portion of
utility for each option depends on the five policy attributes (visibility, healthy days,
gasoline price, vehicle inspection/maintenance and electricity bill), as well as
socioeconomic and attitudinal variables interacted with the alternative specific constant.
The policy benefits and the alternative specific constant are allowed to vary across the
sample. The cost variables were chosen as nonstochastic in order to facilitate model
convergence.
Because healthy days and visibility are benefits that should have positive
coefficients for all respondents, these variables are first specified with triangular
distributions with the standard deviation constrained to equal the mean. The density of
the constrained triangular parameters starts at zero, rises linearly to the mean, and then
declines to zero at twice the mean (Hensher, 2005). A second specification that also
constrains healthy days and visibility to be positive across the sample is to assume that
they are log-normally distributed. The primary difference between the two distributions
is that the log-normal distribution has a very long upper tail, which if not representative
of the sample could inflate the distribution of willingness to pay. While the triangular
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and log-normal models conform to expectations that the benefits provide positive utility
across the sample, for comparison purposes a third model is also specified assuming that
healthy days and visibility are normally distributed. In all models, the alternative specific
constant is specified as having a normal distribution since there is no a priori assumption
regarding its sign. The interactions of the alternative specific constant with
socioeconomic terms are assumed to be constant. The model is specified as follows:
Alternative 1:

Vn1 = α + α~n + (β 1 + β~1n ) * visibility + (β 2 + β~2 n )* healthy days + β 3 *gas +

β 4 *inspection + β5 *electric bill + ∑ β i *constant*(socioeconomic and attitudinal

variables)
Alternative 2:

Vn 2 = α + α~n + (β 1 + β~1n ) * visibility + (β 2 + β~2 n )* healthy days + β 3 *gas +

β 4 *inspection + β5 *electric bill + ∑ β i *constant*(socioeconomic and attitudinal

variables)
Status Quo:

Vn3 = (β 1 + β~1n ) * visibility + (β 2 + β~2 n )* healthy days + β 3 *gas + β 4 *inspection +

β 5 *electric bill

1.5.2 Estimation
The three cost variables were converted to increases in household expenditures
per year for consistency. The electricity bill and vehicle inspection costs are
straightforward: the increase in the electricity bill is already given in yearly expenditure
per household in the survey, and the cost of vehicle inspection is calculated by simply
32

multiplying the per-car cost by the number of vehicles in the household (provided by the
respondent in the survey). The yearly household expenditures on gasoline are imputed by
using the stated number of miles driven per year for the respondent and an estimate of the
number of miles driven per year by the other driving-age members of the household (the
survey elicited the number of household members older than sixteen). 21 The number of
gallons of gasoline per year is estimated by taking the imputed total household miles
driven per year and divided by an estimate of average household fuel economy, which
was derived by the stated number of passenger cars versus sport utility vehicles in the
household. Definitions of variables used in the analysis are given in Table 1.3.

1.6 Results

1.6.1 Analysis of Choice Probabilities
Table 1.4 presents the estimation results for the mixed logit models.22 Model 1
has triangularly distributed benefits, Model 2 has log-normally distributed benefits, and
Model 3 has normally distributed benefits.

21

The 2001 National Household Travel Survey, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Transportation, was
used to estimate the number of miles driven per year for non-respondent household members based on age
and Tennessee residency. If the respondent was over 65, male, and married, then other members of the
household older than sixteen were assumed to drive 4,000 miles per year. If the respondent was over 65,
female, and married, then other members of the household older than sixteen were assumed to drive 9,500
miles per year. If the respondent was younger than 65, male, and married, other driving-age household
members were assumed to drive 10,000 miles per year. If the respondent were younger than 65, female,
and married, other driving-age household members were assumed to drive 20,000 miles per year.
Household fuel economy was derived by assuming that vehicles meet the Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) requirements: 27.5 mpg for passenger cars and 20.7 mpg for SUVs.
22
For comparison, multinomial logit and nested logit models were also run on the data. The procedure
devised by Hausman and McFadden (1984) confirmed that the IIA assumption did not hold for the
multinomial logit model when “Local Policy A” was dropped from the sample (Hausman test statistic =
78.0). A nested logit model was specified where local policy options were partitioned into an “action” nest
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Table 1.3 Variables Used in Mixed Logit Models
Variable

Definition

Policy Specific

Constant
Visibility
Healthy days
Gas
Inspection
Electric bill

Alternative specific constant =1 if Local Policy
A or Local Policy B, else zero (status quo)
Visibility improvement in miles
Number of healthy days improvement
Yearly household increase in gas cost
Yearly household vehicle inspection cost
Yearly household increase in electricity bill

Individual Specific

Lbach
Elbill

Less than bachelors degree*Constant
Monthly electricity bill*Constant

and a “status quo” nest to relax the IIA assumption between nests. However, the inclusive value coefficient
for the action nest exceeded one, indicating that the nest structure did not improve upon the multinomial
logit specification. Even if the IIA assumption were not violated, the multinomial logit and nested logit
models cannot account for unobserved preference heterogeneity or temporal correlation across choice
questions answered by the same individual.
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Table 1.4 Mixed Logit Results

Constant
Visibility
Healthy days

Gas
Inspection
Electricity
Elbill*Constant
Lbach*Constant

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

3.756***
(0.943)
0.074***
(0.007)
0.041***
(0.006)
-0.005***
(0.001)
-0.004***
(0.001)
-0.009***
(0.001)
0.012**
(0.004)
-2.066***
(0.708)

3.279***
(0.980)
-4.195***
(0.328)
-5.947***
(0.026)
-0.006***
(0.001)
-0.003***
(0.001)
-0.007***
(0.001)
0.008
(0.006)
-2.424***
(0.744)

3.325***
(1.036)
0.047***
(0.012)
0.016
(0.012)
-0.004***
(0.001)
-0.002**
(0.001)
-0.010***
(0.001)
0.018***
(0.007)
-2.231***
(0.779)

Standard deviation of random parameters
Constant
Visibility
Healthy days

5.254***
(0.544)
0.074***
(0.007)
0.041***
(0.006)

5.504***
(0.718)
2.347***
(0.118)
4.363***
(0.010)

5.225***
(0.578)
0.089***
(0.013)
0.116***
(0.014)

Model Statistics
Log-Likelihood
-1658.597
-1591.175
-1596.458
Number of choice 2058
2058
2058
sets
Likelihood ratio
0.264
0.294
0.292
index
Standard errors in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote parameter is statistically different from zero
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 1000 Halton draws were used for each
model. 23 Distribution of random parameters across models: Model 1: Constant (normal),
Visibility (triangular), Healthy Days (triangular); Model 2: Constant (normal), Visibility (lognormal), Healthy Days (log-normal); Model 3: Constant (normal), Visibility (normal), Healthy
Days (normal).
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Sensitivity of coefficients to the number of Halton draws was tested using several different numbers of
replications. In general, coefficients began to converge by 500 draws for each model.
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Results of the mixed logit specification with triangularly distributed parameters
(Model 1) indicates that visibility and healthy days positively affect the probability of a
particular alternative being chosen, and are significant at the 1% level. As expected, the
cost variables negatively affect the likelihood of an alternative being chosen, and are also
significant at the 1% level. Heterogeneity around the mean of the random parameters is
taken into account by interacting the random attributes with socioeconomic variables.
The only socioeconomic variables found to significantly affect the mean of at least one
random parameter are “education level less than bachelor’s degree” and “monthly
electricity bill.” The coefficient on the interaction term between individuals with less
than a bachelor’s degree and the constant is negative, suggesting that these individuals
have a greater preference for the status quo relative to those with at least a college
education. Individuals with higher electricity bills are positively associated with the
constant term in the full model, suggesting that those with higher monthly bills prefer an
action alternative. The significance of the standard deviations of the random parameters
indicates that there is still significant heterogeneity in tastes regarding the improvement
in healthy days and visibility, as well as in the constant term, even after including
heterogeneity around the mean. The likelihood ratio index, which measures the
percentage improvement in the log-likelihood function of the specified model over a
model with zero parameters, was approximately 0.26.24 Hensher and Johnson (1981) and
Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) state that a likelihood ratio index between 0.2 and 0.4
indicates the model provides a good fit for the data.

24

This metric is also known as adjusted rho-squared.
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The results of the log-normal specification (Model 2) parallel those of Model 1 in
terms of signs and significance of the coefficients, except that the interaction of the
constant and electricity bill no longer significantly affects the probability that an option
will be chosen.25 The likelihood ratio index improves to 0.29, suggesting a slightly better
fit of the data relative to the constrained triangular model.
The model with normally distributed parameters (Model 3) closely resembles the
triangular model in terms of significant variables, with the notable exception that healthy
days no longer significantly determines the probability of choice. The likelihood ratio
index is approximately 0.29. While this seems to indicate that specifying the random
parameters with normal distributions fits the data better than with triangular distributions,
a consequence of normal distributions is the possibility that a beneficial attribute might
have negative values for some portion of the sample. To determine the percentage of the
sample that the model predicts will derive negative utility from the policy benefits, the
estimated mean and standard deviation of the parameters are used to calculate the
cumulative normal distribution evaluated at zero. Following this procedure, the model
predicts that 28.7% of the sample has a negative value for visibility and 43.8% has a
negative value for healthy days. Obviously this is not consistent with underlying
preferences and is thus a drawback of using normally distributed parameters.

25

The mean effect of a log-normally distributed coefficient

exp( β + s / 2) .
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β

with standard deviation s is obtained by

1.6.2 Testing the Equality of Payment Vehicles
An objective of the study is to investigate whether the type of payment affects
willingness to pay. Wald tests were employed to test the equality of the three payment
coefficients, with results presented in Table 1.5.26
Using a series of pair-wise tests, all models strongly reject that the three payment
coefficients are equal. However, in the log-normal specification, the hypothesis that the
gas price coefficient is equal to the electricity bill coefficient cannot be rejected. These
results suggest that the method of payment affects willingness to pay for improvements in
air quality, and that households may be less averse to paying for policy benefits through
vehicle inspection or gas prices than through an increase in their electricity bill.27 While
we would expect respondents to be indifferent between paying $1 to improve air quality
through gas prices and paying $1 through vehicle inspection, preferences may be affected
by the payment label. For instance, individuals may have a visceral negative response to
any increase in the electricity bill and therefore believe that vehicle inspection is a more
tolerable means of improving air quality. Another possibility is that the discrepancy is
due to survey framing since the choice sets in the survey presented the increase in the
price of gasoline as cents per gallon, the increase in the electricity bill as dollars per year,
and the requirement of a vehicle inspection and maintenance program as dollars per year

26

The Wald statistic provides a test of model restrictions and has a limiting chi-squared distribution with
degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions.
27
This finding is robust to alternative assumptions in the calculation of gas costs. Specifically, models
were run assuming that all other driving age members of the household drive 5,000, 15,000 and 25,000
miles per year. Wald tests rejected all hypotheses that payment coefficients were equal in these models,
with the exception of the hypothesis that Gas = IM in the triangular and normal specifications when other
drivers in the household were assumed to drive 15,000 per year (p=0.342 and p=0.058), and in the
triangular, log-normal and normal specifications in the model assuming other drivers drive 5,000 miles per
year (p=0.225, p=0.779 and p=0.660).
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Table 1.5 Testing the Equality of Payment Vehicles

Gas=IM

Model 1 Model 2
4.45
22.60
(p=0.035)
(p=0)

Model 3
5.56
(p=0.018)

Gas=Electricity

21.97
(p=0)

0.47
(p=0.493)

33.48
(p=0)

IM=Electricity

37.02
(p=0)

18.04
(p=0)

49.02
(p=0)

Entries in table are Wald test statistics with p-values in parentheses.

per vehicle. However, since increases in gas prices are typically stated in the media as
additional cents per gallon, survey framing effects may be irrelevant for the ranking of
policy options if policymakers are only interested in how the public perceives costs.
Evidence that the method of payment affects willingness to pay has also been
found in other stated preference studies. In their meta-analysis of wetland values derived
from contingent valuation applications, Brouwer, Langford, Bateman and Turner (1999)
examined several studies employing different methods of payment and found that
individuals would be willing to pay twice as much if the method of payment were an
income tax as opposed to any other method (e.g., consumer price increases, trip
expenditures). Bergstrom et al (2004) conducted a combination dichotomous
choice/open-ended CV study valuing groundwater in Maine and Georgia and found
through a split-sample survey design that respondents are willing to pay more to improve
water quality through a tax reallocation than through a special tax.28 The tax reallocation
asked respondents to trade off improved groundwater with a reduction in other public

28

The hypothesis of equal willingness to pay for both the special tax and tax reallocation was rejected for
both the open-ended and dichotomous choice elicitation mechanisms.
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goods (purposefully kept vague to reduce protest behavior) that are funded by general
taxes. A working paper by Nunes and Travisi (2006) examined the effect of different
payment vehicles in their choice experiment that values railway noise reduction. They
also find evidence that respondents are willing to pay more for the same amount of noise
reduction if the reduction is financed through a reallocation of the public budget rather
than through a new local tax. In contrast to Bergstrom et al, they specify how the
reallocation of the public budget would occur and find that respondents would prefer that
noise reduction be achieved through a decrease in public administration rather than
through public transport.

1.6.3 Willingness to Pay Calculations
The primary objective of the study is to calculate the public’s willingness to pay
for air quality improvements in order to rank competing policy options. Willingness to
pay is calculated for both marginal and discrete changes. Marginal willingness to pay for
visibility and healthy days is constructed by dividing the attribute coefficient by each of
the three payment coefficients, with results presented in Table 1.6. Confidence intervals
are constructed around the median marginal willingness to pay measure using the
simulation method of Krinsky and Robb (1986).
Results indicate that the public in general is willing to pay to improve air quality,
but this willingness to pay depends on the method of payment. For example, the model
with triangularly distributed benefits indicates that the typical household would be
willing to pay $18.94 for a 1-mile improvement in visibility if paid through an inspection
and maintenance program, $13.97 if paid through an increase in the price of gasoline, and
40

Table 1.6 Marginal Willingness to Pay ($)
Gas

Visibility
IM

Model 1

13.97
(11.0618.78)

18.94
(13.9127.93)

Model 2

7.68
(4.6812.44)

16.02
(9.2631.31)

Model 3

12.96
(7.1129.13)

23.23
(9.84124.58)

Electric
Bill
8.04
(6.91-9.29)

Gas

Days
IM

Electric
Bill
4.47
(3.32-5.78)

7.81
(5.8810.58)

10.53
(7.5315.79)

6.93
(4.3510.82)

3.60
(2.715.29)

7.40
(4.7315.71)

3.26
(2.61-4.60)

4.89
(2.78-6.95)

4.32
(-2.8512.26)

7.66
(-8.2935.58)

1.66
(-0.78-4.07)

Entries in table are median estimates derived by the Krinsky and Robb method. 95% confidence
intervals are in parentheses.
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only $8.04 if paid through an increase in the household’s electricity bill. For an extra
healthy day per year, households are willing to pay $10.53 if paid through vehicle
inspection and maintenance, $7.81 if paid through an increase in the price of gasoline,
and $4.47 if paid through an increase in the electricity bill. The log-normal model
indicates lower median willingness to pay for air quality benefits compared to the
triangular model, although confidence intervals are somewhat larger. While vehicle
inspection is again the preferred method of payment, in this model there is no clear
preference between raising gas prices and increasing the electricity bill. As already
shown, the model with normally distributed benefits stipulates that some portion of the
sample actually derives negative utility from improved air quality. While median
willingness to pay from this model is in general only somewhat lower than the triangular
models, the consequence of normal distributions is more readily seen in the much wider
confidence intervals.
To illustrate how choice experiments can provide information on the desirability
of any policy spanned by the levels of the attributes, willingness to pay for discrete
changes in visibility and the number of healthy days were also calculated. Two levels of
benefits were specified: a “medium” level with an improvement in visibility of 7 miles
and an increase of 24 healthy days per year, and a “high” level with an improvement in
visibility of 15 miles and an increase of 32 healthy days per year (the high level
comprises the upper bound of the attribute levels). Total willingness to pay is found by
using Hanemann’s (1984) formula for compensating surplus. In this case the status quo
is not zero due to existing federal actions that will improve visibility by one mile and the
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number of healthy days by 16, even without any additional local action to reduce
emissions.
Table 1.7 reports total willingness to pay estimates for the medium and high level
of benefits. Again, these results suggest that households are willing to pay for
improvements in healthy days and visibility, and that they would rather pay for these
benefits with a vehicle inspection program or higher gas price than with a higher
electricity bill. For example, in the triangular model (Model 1), compensating surplus for
policy options that result in 32 additional healthy days per year and 15 miles of additional
visibility would be worth approximately $434 if payment were made through vehicle
inspection, but only $184 if achieved by an increase in the electricity bill. The same
qualitative differences between models in calculating marginal willingness to pay also
occur in measuring total willingness to pay.
The ability to compute willingness to pay for any “state of the world” that
encompasses the range of attribute levels is an advantage of choice experiments. Not
only can policymakers rank different policy options that are currently available, but can
also compute willingness to pay for scenarios that materialize with additional
information. This method also lends itself to providing a measure of benefits in cost
benefit analysis.

43

Table 1.7 Total Willingness to Pay ($)

Model 1

Medium Benefits
Gas
IM
Electric
Bill
145.94
197.97
83.77
(116.49(146.63(69.65194.90)
292.78)
100.10)

Gas

High Benefits
IM

319.48
(255.42427.36)

433.68
(321.06643.61)

Electric
Bill
183.68
(153.85218.22)

Model 2

75.26
(53.75111.97)

155.60
(99.01300.81)

67.96
(51.1793.09)

165.75
(117.45248.13)

344.10
(217.44664.51)

149.94
(111.04207.16)

Model 3

110.73
(52.86246.54)

201.48
(74.511037.46)

42.46
(16.5967.73)

247.63
(123.98545.65)

450.52
(170.042286.14)

94.68
(39.51147.78)

Entries in table are median estimates derived by the Krinsky and Robb method. 95% confidence
intervals are in parentheses. Medium benefits are an increase of 24 healthy days and 7 miles
visibility. High benefits are an increase of 32 healthy days and 15 miles visibility.
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1.7 Conclusion

The results of this study indicate that choice experiments are a powerful method
of determining the preferred set of options for policymakers facing many possible
pollution reduction measures. By using choice experiments, policymakers are able to
rank policy options and choose the combination of measures that maximizes welfare as
well as meeting air quality standards. In one application choice experiments can
encompass a wide range of options that could facilitate the choice of policy as more
information on the effects of different control measures becomes available. This method
is particularly beneficial for policymakers in EPA nonattainment areas who have
substantial flexibility in determining which emission reduction measures to undertake in
order to achieve compliance with air quality standards. This is not a trivial observation
considering that there are approximately 150 ozone nonattainment counties and 224
particulate matter nonattainment counties with this kind of flexibility.
The present study of Knoxville, TN indicates that households would receive
substantial welfare gains if air quality were improved, and that willingness to pay is
sensitive to the method of payment. Requiring vehicle inspection seems to be the
payment method to which households are least averse, more than doubling willingness to
pay estimates when it is employed rather than an increase in the household electricity bill.
This finding has important implications for future choice experiments. In particular,
future applications should be explicit about the payment mechanism and policymakers
should acknowledge that results could vary on this basis.
The ability to rank payment options gives policymakers valuable information in
determining the appropriate course of action. For example, if it is determined that
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instituting a vehicle inspection and maintenance program and reformulated gasoline is
sufficient to bring the area into attainment, requiring additional controls on power plants
would be inefficient since the residents express the lowest WTP values when this
payment vehicle is imposed. The valuation of attributes is also important for determining
total benefits to an area for coming into attainment with the EPA standards. Although it
was not known at the time the study was conducted how much healthy days and visibility
would improve in the Knoxville area once it achieved attainment, the choice experiment
framework allows for the calculation of total benefits once these levels are determined
(provided the span of attributes encompasses this range).
A caveat to this conclusion is the uncertainty regarding whether sensitivity to the
payment vehicle is a result of survey framing since not all costs were expressed as
household expenditures per year, although the preamble to the survey questions did
express this. Future research will test sensitivity to such differences in the presentation of
choice sets. It is also important to realize that the willingness to pay measures derived
from this application are short run benefits. In the long run we would expect for
individuals to change their behavior in order to lower costs (e.g., buy a hybrid car to
reduce gasoline costs).
This study also takes preliminary steps to account for sample selection bias in a
mixed logit framework. As this model represents the new standard in analysis of
multinomial choice data, it is imperative that methods are found to alleviate bias that
results when the decision to respond to the survey is correlated in an unknown way with
the choice of policy options. While the present study is inconclusive due to the lack of
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convergence of the sample selection model, the demonstrated method is a promising tool
for addressing this problem. Future research will examine the properties of this model.
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CHAPTER 2: INDUCED-VALUE TESTS OF THE INCENTIVE
COMPATIBILITY OF CHOICE EXPERIMENTS

2.1 Introduction

Stated preference methods, in particular contingent valuation (CV) and more
recently choice experiments (CE), have been used extensively to elicit values for
environmental goods for use in benefit-cost analyses and natural resource damage
litigation. While CV and CE differ in design, both methods use surveys to determine
how respondents trade off a good and money, although no exchange of money actually
takes place. These methods afford the analyst a great degree of control in survey design,
can value potential changes in environmental quality that may not exist in reality, and can
assess passive use values such as the existence value arising from the protection of an
endangered species.
The most common type of stated preference method to value environmental
amenities is contingent valuation (CV), where respondents are given information
regarding a proposed improvement to the good and asked what they would willing to pay
to realize this change. Initial applications of the method asked open-ended willingness to
pay (e.g., “How much would you be willing to pay to provide this hiking trail?”), while
more recent applications typically ask a dichotomous choice question (e.g., “Would you
be willing to pay $x to provide this hiking trail? Please circle yes or no.”) In the 1990s
environmental economists began exploring choice experiments as an alternative to
contingent valuation in valuing environmental amenities. Choice experiments are
derived from conjoint analysis, which has been used extensively in the marketing and
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transportation literature since the 1970s to estimate relative values of a good’s attributes.
Like contingent valuation, this method can estimate use as well as non-use values.
Choice experiments are based on the assumption that individuals derive utility not from a
good itself, but from its constituent attributes (Lancaster, 1966). The technique,
developed by Louviere and Hensher (1982) and Louviere and Woodworth (1983),
consists of presenting respondents with a choice set of options comprised of attributes
with varying levels, and elicits the most preferred option from the choice set. In this way
choice experiments are similar to real world purchase decisions where consumers are
presented with a variety of goods characterized by different attribute levels and choose
whatever gives them the most satisfaction. To identify relative attribute values several
questions are asked per application. Environmental applications include the valuation of
rivers (Morrison and Bennett, 2004), global warming mitigation options (Layton and
Brown, 2000), remnant vegetation (Blamey et al, 2000), water supply options (Blamey et
al, 1999), polluted beaches and rivers (Garrod and Willis, 1999), caribou habitat
(Adamowicz et al, 1998), and freshwater recreation (Adamowicz et al, 1994).
Choice experiments (CE) have been proposed as an alternative to the contingent
valuation (CV) method for valuing public goods for two primary reasons. First, choice
experiments are potentially more cost-effective than CV since multiple attributes of a
good can be simultaneously valued within a single application, facilitating benefit
transfer applications. Second, choice experiments may also avoid yea-saying and
anchoring that have been shown to cause hypothetical bias in dichotomous choice CV
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applications.29 With an orthogonal design of option attributes (including price) and a task
that requires respondents to choose the most preferred outcome rather than answering a
“yes or no” question regarding willingness to pay, it may be less clear to respondents
which option is the “best for the environment” or how much a particular environmental
improvement should cost. However, response rates depend on complexity of the survey
format, and choice experiments impose a heavier cognitive burden by requiring
respondents to compare levels of multiple attributes across options over a series of choice
questions. In addition, DeShazo and Ferma (2002) have shown that choice
inconsistencies may result from the choice set complexity.
Relatively few studies have been conducted to test the incentive properties of
choice experiments. An incentive compatible elicitation mechanism is one where the
decision maker can do no better than to truthfully reveal her preferences, i.e. there is no
strategic incentive to lie. In order for survey questions to provide results consistent with
economic theory, Carson, Groves and Machina (2000) assert that these questions must be
consequential, which they define by two criteria: (1) a respondent cares about the
potential policy to be enacted and (2) she believes her approval of a policy increases the
probability of policy implementation. Other necessary conditions for a stated preference
question to be incentive compatible are that the government can coercively collect
payment upon policy implementation, the good cannot be provided in any other way, and
that the stated preference question involve only two choices. Carson et al (2004) find
empirical evidence that respondent decisions are invariant to the stochastic nature of their
29

Yea-saying occurs when the respondent misrepresents his preferences in order to please the experimenter
or conform to social norms. Anchoring occurs when the respondent uses the payment stated in the survey
as the basis for determining his willingness to pay.
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influence on policy outcomes, as long as the probability of policy implementation
increases with respondent approval. Other evidence supporting the notion of
consequentiality includes research by Liu et al (2006) that finds systematic differences in
the distribution of willingness to pay between respondents who state that they believe a
valuation study is inconsequential and others in the study.
Most studies examining the incentive properties of choice experiments look for
evidence of hypothetical bias where perceived response incentives may deviate from
those in an analogous situation with direct financial implications.30 Carlsson and
Martinsson (2001) test the validity of choice experiments with donations for
environmental projects, and find no differences between actual and hypothetical marginal
willingness to pay. Lusk and Schroeder (2004) find that hypothetical choices
overestimate total willingness to pay for a private good, beef steaks, but that marginal
willingness to pay for a change in steak quality is generally not significantly different
across hypothetical and actual settings. Carlsson et al (2005) find that the estimated
marginal willingness to pay for food is significantly lower when a cheap talk script is
used in the survey instrument.31 List et al (2006) find no evidence of hypothetical bias
(with or without cheap talk) in the marginal willingness to pay for attributes of baseball
cards. In addition, they find that responses elicited for the provision of a public good
(contributions to the University of Central Florida’s Center for Environmental Policy
Analysis) were not significantly different between real and hypothetical cheap talk
30

See Murphy et al (2004) and List and Gallet (2001) for meta-analyses of hypothetical bias in stated
preference valuation.
31
Cheap talk refers to providing survey recipients with information regarding the tendency of overstating
willingness to pay in a survey format. This script is provided before respondents are asked their
willingness to pay.
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treatments, although subjects were more likely to donate if the treatment were
hypothetical without cheap talk.
Two studies of choice experiments have been conducted in a classroom setting.
Boyle et al (2006) seek to explain the discrepancy of value estimates between choice
experiments32 and contingent valuation by examining various provision rules. They
describe three provision rule treatments: an individual provision rule that implements the
option that an individual actually chose, a group provision rule that implements the
option receiving the most support regardless if it was chosen by a particular subject, and
no provision rule that is intended to mimic field applications of choice experiments.
Their results suggest that the inclusion of the individual provision rule significantly
reduces the number of subjects who opt-in to the market for a private good, T-shirts,
relative to the group provision rule and no provision rule treatments. In valuing a realworld public good, a local non-profit organization called Trees Atlanta that plants trees in
the Atlanta metro area, they find that the group provision rule and no provision rule
treatments yield higher marginal values than either the real or hypothetical individual
provision rule treatments. The only test of the incentive compatibility of choice
experiments using induced values in a lab setting is concurrent research by Carson et al
(2006). They test if the rate of non-demand revealing responses significantly differs
across elicitation formats that vary by the number of options (dichotomous choice vs.
trichotomous choice) and the number of choice sets (single vs. repeated). They find that
while the frequency of violations of the independence of irrelevant alternatives in the

32

In their paper, as elsewhere in the discrete choice literature, choice experiments is referred to as “choice
modeling.” Choice experiments have also been referred to as conjoint-based choice experiments.
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multiple choice treatments are not significant, the rate of non-demand revelation in the
repeated trichotomous choice treatment is significantly higher than in the repeated
dichotomous choice treatment.
The main shortcoming of this literature, from the purview of this paper, is a lack
of studies that employ both a hypothetical and a real payment scenario that are
theoretically incentive compatible, at least under plausible assumptions. Without
incentive compatibility, or at least a strong foundation of the incentive properties of the
elicitation mechanisms in both hypothetical and real payment settings, it is difficult to
decipher what is driving observed differences between the two. Further, absent incentive
compatibility and individual rationality, it is impossible to know whether the observed
results will be replicable. The vast majority of studies exploring hypothetical bias use a
purely hypothetical setting, for which incentive compatibility seems very unlikely.
Carson et al (2004) show that this has a dramatic effect on survey responses, with
respondents answering a dichotomous choice referendum-type CV question differently
depending on whether there is a positive probability that the vote will be binding.
Certainly in field surveys, respondents are at least generally led to believe that policy
may be influenced by survey responses and thus may not treat the survey as a purely
hypothetical exercise.
This study offers a fresh perspective on hypothetical bias by testing the choice
experiment format for incentive compatibility in an induced-value, laboratory setting.
The laboratory experiments compare the performance of dichotomous choice and
trichotomous choice questions across three real payment provision rules: plurality voting
(PV), a vague decision rule based solely on respondent decisions (V1), and a vague
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decision rule based on both respondent decisions and the actions of the implementing
agency (V2). The plurality vote rule serves as a benchmark. The induced value
framework used in the study serves to mitigate confounding factors that appear to plague
many of the previous studies on hypothetical bias such as participant altruism and
attitudes toward risk. Participants do not know the range or distribution of group values
so they cannot discern which response would improve the payoff of other subjects, and
subjects have no incentive to engage in risk-averse or risk-loving behavior since values
are certain across all treatments.
While the typical CE field application does not explicitly contain or infer a
decision rule describing how responses affect a good’s provision (as opposed to a CV
referendum-type dichotomous choice question), respondents are generally informed that
survey responses will be taken into consideration in the policymaking process. It
therefore seems reasonable to believe that CE applications meet Carson, Groves, and
Machina’s requirement of consequentiality, although the respondent is uncertain as to
how much influence her responses will have on eventual policy outcomes. The vague
decision rule treatments in the laboratory experiment therefore give subjects incomplete
information to parallel field applications where respondents may be relatively uninformed
about how their responses map into agency actions as opposed to a political election or
debated public referendum. Polome (2003) also explores the performance of this kind of
provision rule in an induced value dichotomous choice CV experiment. The vague
provision rule used in his study asks respondents to make their decisions as if the
provision rule were a referendum, but notes that a different kind of provision rule could
be used ex ante. He finds that while only half of the subjects truthfully revealed their
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willingness to pay, deviations from theory were not correlated with induced values,
suggesting that deviations may occur from some individual behavioral characteristics.
This study investigates the theoretical properties of both dichotomous choice and
trichotomous choice elicitation formats under plurality voting rules and more generally
under the assumption that the respondent perceives her decision to have some influence
on the outcome. It is well-known that multiple choice formats cannot be incentive
compatible without placing restrictions on preferences (Gibbard, 1973 and Satterthwaite,
1975).33 However, the trichotomous choice format is incentive compatible when certain
assumptions are made on the prior beliefs an individual has about the preferences of
others, such as if the respondent believes each option has equal support from the group.
This kind of belief seems plausible in the context of a field survey where, unlike a
political race, there is no clear signal about the preferences of other survey respondents.
However, certain belief structures, such as believing the majority of respondents prefer
that no action is taken, can give rise to status quo bias, which is often an issue of concern
in choice experiment applications. Status quo bias reflects the tendency of individuals to
have an endowment effect for the current state and to require compensation to undertake
an action, even one that would otherwise leave utility unchanged. The experimental
design allows for direct tests of status quo bias by including choice sets with a status quo
option where all participants receive a positive return and alternative option(s) that result
in gains and losses relative to the status quo. The empirical analysis focuses on the
demand revealing properties of the elicitation mechanisms, the effects of vague provision
rules on responses, and tests of status quo bias.
33

Multiple choice formats refer to choice situations with more than two alternatives.
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 explores the theoretical basis for
incentive compatibility of dichotomous and trichotomous choice elicitation formats,
Section 2.3 describes the experimental design, Section 2.4 presents empirical results and
Section 2.5 concludes.
Results indicate that certain belief structures can lead to incentive compatible
outcomes in a trichotomous choice format, depending on how a respondent believes the
agency will incorporate respondent decisions into the provision of a public good. While
experimental evidence shows that both dichotomous and trichotomous formats can lead
to accurate assessments of willingness to pay, the trichotomous choice format
surprisingly had fewer deviations from theory and was less subject to status quo bias. Of
particular interest is the presence of fewer deviations from theory in the CE dichotomous
choice format relative to empirical studies of dichotomous choice contingent valuation.
This suggests that CV applications may be improved by adopting the attribute-based CE
format for two options.

2.2 Theoretically Incentive Compatible Elicitation Mechanisms

One argument for the choice of the dichotomous choice referendum elicitation
format in contingent valuation is the well-known result of its incentive compatibility,
provided that the agency can compel payment if the good is provided and that a single
issue is involved (Carson, Groves, and Machina, 2000). This result is not restricted to
binding plurality vote mechanisms, but occurs as long as the survey instrument is
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consequential (the respondent believes there is a non-zero probability that her responses
will influence the agency’s action).
What of the incentive compatibility of a choice set with three alternatives? It is
well-known that any mechanism other than a binary response cannot be incentive
compatible without restricting agent preferences (Gibbard, 1973 and Satterthwaite, 1975).
The question, then, is to what degree agent preferences must be restricted to achieve an
incentive compatible outcome or under what circumstances this outcome is likely to
occur. The voting literature states that an expected utility maximizing agent who faces
three choices with a simple plurality winner will generally limit her choice to the two
options that provide the highest unconditional expected utility. Affecting the
respondent’s strategic response is her preferred choice, her expectation of what others
will choose, and her perception of how the agency will aggregate and incorporate survey
data in policy decisions. In a political context such as the dominant two-party structure in
the U.S., this typically implies that while a third party candidate may be the voter’s
preferred choice, the voter will likely select one of the major two party candidates since
she believes (possibly from the common release of public opinion polls) only they have a
realistic chance of winning. Stated preference surveys, on the other hand, usually inquire
about the provision of public goods, with which respondents may be less familiar than
political races and consequently have fewer prior beliefs about which options are most
likely to be enacted.
Following McKelvey and Ordeshook (1972), an agent derives utility from each
option available. When faced with three choices, she will compare her expected utility
from her unconditional top two choices, denoted options 1 and 2. Assuming risk
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neutrality, this is equivalent to comparing her expected payoffs from her unconditional
top two choices. Letting E1 and E 2 represent her expected payoffs from choosing
options 1 and 2 respectively, we have:

E1 = p12 (b1 − b2 ) + p13 (b1 − b3 )

(2.1)

E 2 = p12 (b2 − b1 ) + p 23 (b2 − b3 )

(2.2)

where bi denotes the respondent’s payoff if option i is implemented and pij is the pivot
probability between options i and j. The pivot probability represents the probability that
an agent will be decisive in breaking a tie between the two options. Given this notation,
the respondent’s decision rule can be written as follows:
If E1 − E 2 > 0 , choose option 1
If E1 − E 2 < 0 , choose option 2
where

E1 − E 2 = 2 p12 (b1 − b2 ) + p13 (b1 − b3 ) − p 23 (b2 − b3 )

(2.3)

If the respondent strategically chooses the option that provides the highest payoff

bi , then the elicitation mechanism can be characterized as incentive compatible.
However, the respondent may select his second-most preferred option due to the impact
of the pivot probabilities in (2.3). We assume the pivot probabilities depend on
respondent beliefs about the likelihood that the agency will implement either option so
that:

[

]

pij = f Ai (⋅), A j (⋅)
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where Ai is the perceived likelihood that the agency will implement option i. Ai depends
on the respondent’s beliefs regarding the total voter support of the option (including her
own choice), denoted Ti, as well as other factors, Yi, that measure the strength of
policymaker preferences (independent from voter preferences) for option i.34 The
provision rule, denoted r, is expected to impact both total voter support as well as Yi.
Therefore,

Ai = Ai (Ti (r ), Yi (r ))
and

[

]

pij = f Ai (Ti (r ), Yi (r )), A j (T j (r ), Y j (r )) .

The provision rule describes how the agency will use respondent choices to
determine a policy strategy and determines whether other factors besides votes, such as
policymaker preferences, can influence the agency decision. If a survey is thought to be
inconsequential, as would be the case if the survey were purely methodological and
respondents were told that responses would not be used as an input to any policy making,
the pivot probabilities between any two choices would be zero and theory has little to say
about what is driving responses. Studies that use purely hypothetical treatment to explore
bias are thereby flawed.
The CE format generally has three options – the status quo and two generic
departures from the status quo. If the survey is carefully designed to ensure the
plausibility of any of these options so the respondent does not simply dismiss an option
out-of-hand, it is reasonable that in many cases prior beliefs may be uniformly distributed
34

For example, policymaker preferences could depend on the cost of implementing the option, the
timeframe of implementation, or other political considerations.
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among the options. This is because, unlike public referenda, there is generally little
publicity surrounding policies in valuation surveys and hence only crude information,
such as beliefs about the distribution of environmental preferences, from which to form a
reasonable prior. The experimental design of CE applications may render beliefs as
relatively uninformative since attribute levels are systematically varied, making options
more difficult to categorize. For example, a CE application related to air quality
improvements might define options with the following attributes: the number of healthy
days per year, improvement in scenic visibility per year, and a cost measure such as an
increase in yearly electricity bills. To enable statistical identification, levels of the
attributes vary orthogonally such that respondents who in general want better air quality
must still trade off the two attributes of air quality (assuming that the number of healthy
days and visibility are not perfectly correlated). This kind of variation may make it
difficult to determine how other respondents will choose between the options, as well as
to determine how the agency will use a sequence of such choices. Given the assumption
of uninfomed prior beliefs across options, we show in the next section that under certain
circumstances, the trichotomous choice format can be incentive compatible.
It is possible, however, that respondents may have prior beliefs regarding the
status quo option that is typically present in CE applications. Respondents may feel that
the status quo is unlikely and thus only choose between the other two “action” options, or
may believe that the cost associated with an action alternative understates the true cost
and so chooses the status quo even if one of the action alternatives would be preferable.
Consequently researchers should evaluate on a case-by-case basis the likelihood of prior
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beliefs causing strategic departures from the truthful revelation of preferences and strive
to ensure the plausibility of all options, including the status quo.

2.3 Experimental Design

One hundred and ninety-six students were recruited at the University of
Tennessee in the spring of 2006. Experiments were conducted in a laboratory setting, in
groups ranging in size from five to twenty. Each participant received an initial balance of
$7, with final earnings determined by the option implemented for everyone in the group.
Experiments were short, lasting no more than 45 minutes.
Comparing the performance of dichotomous choice (DC) with trichotomous
choice (TC) across three provision rules, there are six treatments. Each participant was
given a copy of the instructions pertaining to the relevant treatment, which were read
aloud in each session. Instructions described how six choice questions would be
presented, with each question consisting of a set of options. Each option specified how
many units of two goods would be provided and the total cost associated with their
provision. The two goods were labeled as Red and Blue, and were worth money to
participants, based on their induced values, if provided. An example of a choice question
was given to demonstrate the outcomes in terms of the number of Red and Blue goods
provided and the cost of provision for all options within the question. The DC format
consisted of two options, while the TC format consisted of three options per choice set.
The structure of the TC choice set is similar to how a choice set is presented in a field
survey. Each choice set contained a status quo option where one unit of both Red and
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Blue goods was provided at zero cost. Having positive levels of the number of goods in
the status quo option was designed to mimic field applications where some amount of a
public good will be provided regardless of policy action, and researchers are attempting
to discover if there is support for additional amounts of the good. The status quo was the
same for all questions while the attributes in the other options varied per question.
Participants were told that one of the options would be implemented for everyone in the
experiment based on choices made by everyone in the experiment, and were shown how
earnings would be calculated for this implemented option. To control for order effects,
each treatment was subdivided into five orderings of questions. Subjects were told that
for a particular question everyone faces the same options, but that everyone would not
see the questions in the same order. Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 provide examples of the
choice question in the DC and TC formats.
To ensure that participants understood earnings calculations, another example
choice question was presented to respondents followed by questions regarding their
earnings if a particular option were implemented. For the DC format respondents were
asked to calculate earnings for the two options in the choice set, while the TC format
required earnings calculations for all three options. All participants were checked by the
experimenter before being able to continue with the experiment. Those subjects who
calculated earnings for each option correctly earned $2.
Subjects were then told how an option would be implemented according to the
provision rule associated with the subject’s treatment. After answering all six choice
questions, a volunteer rolled a six-sided die to determine which choice question would be
used to calculate earnings. The outcome determined by the provision rule was announced
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Suppose the following two options were the only options available to produce Red
and Blue goods. Please examine your Value Card and indicate which option you
prefer by checking one of the boxes below.
Option A

Option B:
Status Quo

Number of Red goods provided

3 units

1 unit

Number of Blue goods provided

1 unit

1 unit

$4

$0

Total cost per person
I would choose:

Option A

Option B

Figure 2.1: Dichotomous Choice Sample Question

Suppose the following three options were the only options available to produce Red
and Blue goods. Please examine your Value Card and indicate which option you
prefer by checking one of the boxes below.
Option A

Option B

Option C:
Status Quo

Number of Red goods provided

3 units

2 units

1 unit

Number of Blue goods provided

1 unit

3 units

1 unit

$4

$6

$0

Total cost per person
I choose:

Option A

Option B

Figure 2.2: Trichotomous Choice Sample Question
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Option C

to the group who could then calculate earnings for the session. The experiment
concluded with a questionnaire that gathered basic demographics and information on the
number of economics classes taken, previous knowledge of public goods, academic
major, prior voting in state/national elections, and the degree to which the subject
understood the experiment instructions.

2.3.1 Induced Values
Subjects received a “Value Card” indicating their per-unit induced value for Red
and Blue goods and describing how their earnings are calculated for any option that is
implemented. Subjects were told that not everyone had the same values, so that they
should closely examine their values and not reveal them to anyone in the group. Subjects
were not told the range or distribution of values for participants in their group. Subjects
received induced values of $1, $2, or $3 for the Red and Blue goods, with all
combinations used in the design except for ($3.00, $3.00) for a total of 8 sets of induced
values.

2.3.2 Factorial Design of Options
Each option consisted of three attributes: the number of Red and Blue units
provided and the total cost of the option. For options other than the status quo, each
attribute had two levels. The number of Red goods could equal either 1 or 2, the number
of Blue goods could equal 1 or 3, and the total cost could equal $2.50 or $4.00. The full
factorial of options for the DC format is therefore 23 = 8, and 23x2 = 64 for the TC format.
After deleting options that were either dominated by the other options (e.g., one unit each
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of Red and Blue goods were provided but at a positive cost) or duplicate another choice
set but with a different order of options, six choice sets were available for the DC format
and seven choice sets remained for the TC format. In order to keep the number of
questions constant between treatments, six questions were used for both DC and TC
formats.

2.3.3 Provision Rules
2.3.3.1 Plurality Vote Provision Rule
The plurality vote rule is straightforward: the option that receives the most votes
is implemented for everyone in the group. The DC plurality vote rule serves as the
benchmark since it is well-established that a theoretical incentive compatible elicitation
in a stated preference survey requires a “one-shot” DC question coupled with a coercive
provision rule such as a referendum vote (Carson, Groves, and Machina, 2000). In a TC
context, the incentive compatibility of the plurality rule relies on respondent beliefs. In
the model discussed previously, these beliefs are manifested in the pivot probabilities.
Because the plurality rule only relies on other voters as determinants of a good’s
provision, the decision of the respondent will be based on her preferences and what she
believes are the preferences of the other people in the group. The belief regarding the
agency’s likelihood of implementing a particular option, then, is reduced from

Ai = Ai (Ti (r ), Yi (r )) to Ai = Ai (Ti (r )) . To operationalize equation (2.3), assume that the
net payoff of option i can be represented as: bi = Vred × red i + Vblue × bluei –

Cost i where Vred and Vblue are the per-unit induced values for Red and Blue goods, red i
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and bluei are the number of Red and Blue goods provided in option i, and Cost i is the
total cost of providing option i. In general, the pivot probability between options i and j
can be rewritten as the absolute value of the difference between the probability that an
option will be implemented when the respondent chooses option i: pij = abs [prob(i + 1) –
prob(j)] where prob(i + 1) represents the probability that option i is implemented given
the respondent chooses it and prob(j) represents the probability that option j is
implemented. Suppose that there are N participants in the group with a choice set of
three options and that N 1 represents the number of votes for option 1, N 2 the number of
votes for option 2, and N 3 the number of votes for option 3. The probability then that
option i is implemented is the probability that N i > N j for i ≠ j . If the respondent
believes that preferences among the three options are distributed uniformly so that,
without his vote, N 1 = N 2 = N 3 , then pij = 1 since N i = N j . In other words, if the
respondent believes that preferences are distributed uniformly across each option, then
the probability that he is pivotal becomes 1. According to (2.3), he would then choose
the option that yields the highest payoff. Since the range of induced values is unknown
and generic goods are used in the experiment, we therefore expected that subjects would
answer truthfully under this provision rule.

2.3.3.2 Vague Provision Rule (V1)
The vague provision rule (V1) again limits the agency to depend solely on
respondent decisions for implementation of the good, but is not as straightforward as the
plurality voting rule. Subjects were instructed that the experimenters will place poker
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chips in a bag according to the option that each subject selected for the choice question
that is used to determine experiment earnings. For example, if the subject chose Option
A, the experimenters placed a white chip in the bag, a black chip was placed in the bag if
Option B were chosen, and if the treatment was trichotomous choice, a green chip was
placed in the bag for Option C. A volunteer then drew a poker chip out of the bag, and
the color of the drawn chip determined which option was implemented for the entire
group. This provision rule satisfies the consequentiality requirement of Carson, Groves,
and Machina since the subject’s choice increases the probability of implementation, but
allows more subject uncertainty than the simple plurality voting rule in how responses
lead to public good provision. This rule may more closely mimic field applications of
choice experiments where respondents are led to believe that their decisions will be
considered in the policymaking process but do not know how much influence their
responses have.
Following the model discussed previously, subjects would take into consideration
beliefs about how others in the group are choosing options as well as how they believe
the agency (the experiment coordinators) will use respondent decisions. The uncertainty
of this rule is reflected in how the total number of votes for option i, Ti, affects the
probability that option i is implemented, Ai. Obviously Ti will affect Ai less under this
provision rule than the plurality voting rule, reducing the respondent’s pivot probability
(assuming again that subjects in this experiment essentially have no informative beliefs
regarding relative support for each option among other subjects). While the probability
of implementation increases with a subject’s vote, the probability that a subject is pivotal
decreases with this rule compared with the plurality rule. Assuming again that
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preferences are uniformly distributed, the pivot probability now becomes: pij =
abs[( N i + 1)/N – N j /N] = 1/N since N i = N j . While it would still be in the best interest
of the subject to reveal her true preferences according to (2.3), the incentive to do so may
be weakened relative to the plurality rule since she has less of a chance of being pivotal
between options.

2.3.3.3 Vague with Regulator Provision Rule (V2)
The “vague with regulator” provision rule (V2) is similar to the vague provision
rule, but now provision depends only partially on respondent decisions. Subjects were
again instructed that different colored chips would be placed in the bag according to their
choice for the randomly chosen question (white for Option A, black for Option B, and, if
a trichotomous choice treatment, green for Option C), but now additional blue chips
would be added by the experimenter. The number of blue chips added by the
experimenter would equal the number of people in the group, so half of the chips in the
bag come from subject decisions and half come from the experimenter. If the chip
randomly drawn from the bag were a blue chip, the experimenter then revealed whether
Option A, Option B, or in the trichotomous choice format, Option C was to be
implemented. Subjects were told that the experimenter had written down on a piece of
paper the option that corresponds to a blue chip being drawn, and were shown that folded
piece of paper during the instructions. The option was kept secret until a blue chip was
drawn at the end of the experiment. Sample instructions for this provision rule within the
trichotomous choice elicitation format are included in Appendix D.
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This provision rule intends to capture uncertainty respondents have in actual
choice experiments over preferences of the implementing agency, as well as those of
other respondents. Again assuming that subjects have uninformative beliefs regarding
others in the group (and hence assume a uniform distribution of preferences), incentive
compatibility relies on the effect of subject’s beliefs about the likelihood of agency
implementation on the pivot probabilities between options. Like the vague rule, this rule
reduces the impact of voters on the pivot probability relative to the plurality rule.
However, the respondent now considers other factors Y, which may increase or decrease
the pivot probability relative to the vague rule. If the subject believes that the regulator
will choose option i, the pivot probability becomes: pij = abs[( N i + N +1)/(2N) –
N j /(2N)] = (N+1)/(2N) since N i = N j , which is greater than the pivot probability under

the vague rule. If the subject believes the regulator will choose option j, then pij = (N 1)/(2N), which again is greater than the pivot probability under the vague rule if N > 3. If
the subject believes the regulator will choose an option other than i or j, then pij =
1/(2N). The latter belief results in a lower pivot probability relative to the vague rule.
While the incentive remains to truthfully reveal preferences regardless of the belief
regarding agency implementation (assuming uniformly distributed preferences among
subjects), it cannot be predicted a priori whether V1 or V2 has the stronger incentive
without making assumptions regarding which option subjects believe the regulator will
choose. For example, if subjects believe the regulators are equally likely to choose any
of the three options, then pij = abs[( N i + N/3 +1)/(2N) – ( N j +N/3)/(2N)] = 1/(2N) since

N i = N j , and we would predict that V1 would have the stronger incentive than V2.
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In summary, we would expect to find evidence of incentive compatibility with all
three provision rules given the assumption of uninformative beliefs regarding other
voters. The strongest incentive to reveal preferences occurs under the plurality rule. We
cannot predict the relative strength of the incentive to truthfully reveal preferences
between V1 and V2 unless subjects believe that regulator preferences are uniformly
distributed, in which case V1 has the stronger incentive.

2.4 Results

Summary statistics on decisions that deviate from theory are presented in Table
2.1. Decision deviations are defined as choices that do not conform to theory by
maximizing payoffs in a particular choice set. Those DC questions that have equal
payoffs for both options are excluded from this definition since it is impossible to deviate
from theory. Since there were no TC questions that had equal payoffs for all three
options, all TC questions were included in this metric. An immediate observation is that,
contrary to expectations, the TC format has fewer deviations than the DC format across
all three provision rules, and that V2 has fewer deviations than V1 across elicitation
formats. The fact that there were fewer deviations in TC treatments than DC treatments
is particularly striking since more opportunities exist to make deviations in this format.
As expected, the plurality vote rule has the fewest deviations across treatments, although
it is surprising that the TC plurality vote treatment has fewer deviations than the DC
plurality vote treatment. Large deviations are defined as those questions where net
earnings of the alternative chosen are at least $1 less than the next-best alternative.
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Table 2.1 Deviations from Theory
Treatment
DCP
DCV1
DCV2
TCP
TCV1
TCV2

N
34
31
31
34
31
32

Deviations
2.2%
18.2%
8.4%
1.0%
8.6%
3.1%

Large Deviations
0.5%
9.7%
5.9%
0.0%
4.3%
0.5%

Deviation = Alternative chosen does not maximize expected net earnings; Large deviation = Net
earnings of alternative chosen are at least $1 less than next-best alternative; DCP = Dichotomous
Choice Plurality Provision Rule; DCV1 = Dichotomous Choice Vague Provision Rule; DCV2 =
Dichotomous Choice Vague with Regulator Provision Rule; TCP = Trichotomous Choice
Plurality Provision Rule; TCV1 = Trichotomous Choice Vague Provision Rule; TCV2 =
Trichotomous Choice Vague with Regulator Provision Rule.

One immediate observation involves the rate of deviations in the dichotomous
choice plurality rule treatment. This treatment closely resembles referendum CV
questions since only two options are presented and the option that receives the most
support is implemented. As noted in Table 2.1, the rate of deviations is 2.2% (for large
deviations the rate is 0.5%). Other induced value studies that test hypothetical
referendum CV questions have resulted in higher rates: Vossler and McKee (2006) find
deviation rates of 6.9% (2.1% for large deviations) while Taylor et al (2001) find
deviation rates of 16.7%. Since the incentive properties should be the same across
formats, the discrepancy could partially be explained by the difference in elicitation
format. Perhaps the choice experiment framework, where the subject simply picks the
most preferred option of attributes, leads to a higher rate of demand revelation than the
CV format that requires an all-or-nothing decision. Other possible explanations could
include differences in experimental design such as the distribution of values and costs
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across the samples or the presence or absence of an example that describes how earnings
are calculated.
To enable comparison across treatments in the current study, Table 2.2 reports
deviations by spread, which is defined as the difference in payoffs between the top two
alternatives within a choice question. The DC format had a range of spreads from zero to
$5.50, while the range of spreads in the TC format extended from zero to $4.50. The
table is reported as the percentage of deviations in the number of questions with a
particular spread. A spread equal to zero, for example, implies that two options yield the
same payoffs. As one would expect, this reduces the chance of deviating in the TC
format (it is impossible to deviate under the DC format under a zero spread), and indeed
the percentage of deviations from these types of questions is zero for V1 and V2
trichotomous choice treatments. While questions with zero spread account for both
deviations in the TC plurality rule treatment, the deviations were committed by the same
individual. Because no deviations occurred for DC formats at a spread of $5 or $5.50,
these spreads are not included in the table.
Table 2.3 presents tests of decision deviations by spread. All hypotheses are
tested using the Fisher exact test. The hypothesis that all DC formats are equal to all TC
formats is rejected at the 5% significance level for a spread of $1, and at the 10% level at
a spread of $2, while it cannot be rejected at any other spread. Under the DC treatment,
the hypothesis that the plurality rule is equal to V1 can be rejected at the 5% level at a
spread of $2.00 and at the 10% level for spreads of $1.00 and $3.00. Under the TC
treatment this hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% level at spreads of $0.50 and $1.00.
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Table 2.2 Deviations by Spread
Spread
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5

DCP
NA
8.3%
4.8%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

DCV1
NA
23.5%
27.8%
6.9%
12.1%
16.7%
15.0%
9.1%
0.0%
11.1%

DCV2
NA
5.9%
5.6%
10.3%
12.1%
0.0%
5.0%
18.2%
0.0%
0.0%

TCP
6.7%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

TCV1
0.0%
14.3%
25.0%
8.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

TCV2
0.0%
3.1%
0.0%
0.0%
4.2%
0.0%
0.0%
12.5%
25.0%
0.0%

Entries in table are the ratios of deviations from theory to the number of questions with a
particular spread. Spread = Difference in earnings between top two alternatives; DCP =
Dichotomous Choice Plurality Provision Rule; DCV1 = Dichotomous Choice Vague Provision
Rule; DCV2 = Dichotomous Choice Vague with Regulator Provision Rule; TCP = Trichotomous
Choice Plurality Provision Rule; TCV1 = Trichotomous Choice Vague Provision Rule; TCV2 =
Trichotomous Choice Vague with Regulator Provision Rule; NA = not applicable.

Table 2.3 Tests of Deviations by Spread

Spread

0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5

All DC=
All TC
NA
0.047
0.550
0.461
0.085
0.455
0.569
0.641
0.543
NA

DCP =
DCV1
NA
0.106
0.073
0.222
0.050
0.429
0.092
0.478
NA
0.474

DCP =
DCV2
NA
1.000
1.000
0.102
0.050
NA
0.465
0.217
NA
NA

Hypothesis
DCV1 =
DCV2
NA
0.083
0.177
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.605
1.000
NA
1.000

TCP =
TCV1
0.492
0.001
0.018
0.235
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

TCP =
TCV2
0.492
0.240
NA
NA
1.000
NA
NA
1.000
0.467
NA

TCV1 =
TCV2
NA
0.030
0.047
0.489
1.000
NA
NA
NA
0.467
NA

Entries in table provide the Fisher exact p-value. DCP = Dichotomous Choice Plurality Provision
Rule; DCV1 = Dichotomous Choice Vague Provision Rule; DCV2 = Dichotomous Choice Vague
with Regulator Provision Rule; TCP = Trichotomous Choice Plurality Provision Rule; TCV1 =
Trichotomous Choice Vague Provision Rule; TCV2 = Trichotomous Choice Vague with
Regulator Provision Rule; NA = not applicable.
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The hypothesis that the plurality rule is equal to V2 cannot be rejected for any spread
under TC, but can be rejected at the 5% level at a spread of $2.00 under DC. The
hypothesis that V1 is equal to V2 is rejected for the DC treatment at the 10% level at a
spread of $0.50, and at a 5% level under TC at spreads of $0.50 and $1.00. These results
suggest that there is some evidence that the TC format has significantly fewer deviations
than the DC format and that the plurality rule treatments do not in general differ from the
V2 treatments, but do differ from the V1 treatments. The majority of significant
differences between the benchmark plurality rule and the other provision rules occur at
relatively lower spreads where the opportunity cost of deviating from theory is lower.
To formally model decision deviations, probit models were estimated within and
across elicitation formats using design conditions and respondent characteristics as
explanatory variables (see Table 2.4 for definitions of the variables). Results are
presented in Table 2.5 as marginal effects for ease of interpretation. Each participant
answered six questions, and since it is likely that the unobserved heterogeneity is
correlated across the responses from the same individual, we arbitrarily allow for this
type of correlation by using the Huber-White “sandwich” covariance matrix estimator.
This is consistent with a random effects type of error structure without assuming the
random effect is additive with a specific distribution. The full model consisting of
observations across elicitation formats suggests that respondents in the TC treatments are
4.2% less likely to deviate from theory than those in DC treatments, those in the V1
treatment are 9.4% more likely to deviate than respondents in the plurality treatment, and
those in the V2 treatment are no more likely to deviate from theory than those in the
plurality treatment. While it is unclear why more deviations occurred in the
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Table 2.4 Description of Explanatory Variables
Variable name

Description

TC

= 1 if elicitation mechanism is
trichotomous choice
= 1 if provision rule is vague
= 1 if provision rule is vague with
regulator
Number of participants in the subject’s
group
Absolute value of net earnings
Difference between earnings of top two
alternatives within a choice question
Subject’s age, in years
= 1 if subject is male
= 1 if subject has a math-intensive major
(e.g., engineering, statistics)
= 1 if subject participated in a previous
economics experiment
= 1 if subject in any prior state or
national election
= 1 if subject had studied the economics
of public goods
Alternative specific constant = 1 if choice
represents an ‘action’ alternative as
opposed to the status quo

V1
V2
Group Size
Distance
Spread
Age
Male
Math
Experience
Voted
Public Goods
Constant
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Sample Mean
(std. dev.)
0.602 (0.489)

0.321 (0.467
0.327 (0.469)
15.150 (3.553)
3.962 (2.034)
1.463 (1.232)
20.820 (3.461)
0.618 (0.486)
0.413 (0.492)
0.757 (0.429)
0.690 (0.463)
0.587 (0.493)
0.600 (0.490)

Table 2.5 Probit Analysis of Deviations
All
Observations

Dichotomous
Choice

Trichotomous
Choice

TC

-0.042*
(0.024)

V1

0.094**
(0.041)

0.139**
(0.058)

0.045
(0.056)

V2

0.046
(0.034)

0.081
(0.055)

0.026
(0.038)

Group Size

-0.002
(0.002)

-0.003
(0.003)

-0.002
(0.006)

Spread

-0.011
(0.007)

-0.019**
(0.009)

-0.004
(0.008)

Age

0.002*
(0.001)

0.004**
(0.002)

0.002
(0.002)

Male

0.012
(0.019)

0.008
(0.031)

0.011
(0.017)

Experience

-0.020
(0.026)

0.014
(0.036)

-0.051
(0.040)

Voted

0.007
(0.019)

0.008
(0.031)

0.006
(0.020)

-214.710

-129.590
0.113

-81.086
0.126

521

559

Model Statistics
Log-Likelihood
Likelihood ratio
index
N

0.116
1080

Dependent variable = 1 if respondent deviates from theory; = 0 otherwise. Entries in table are
marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote parameter is
statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. The
likelihood ratio index provides the percentage increase in the log-likelihood function relative to
the model estimated with constants only.
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DC format relative to the TC format, the other results are consistent with the theoretical
model of voting described earlier. The addition of poker chips by the experimenters may
have led some respondents to believe their choice was more pivotal, and consequently
encouraged the selection of the choice that maximized earnings. It is harder to explain
the discrepancy between the TC and DC elicitation formats. One possibility is that
participants adopted simple heuristics for questions with only two options while the
three-option format may have stimulated participants to think about the exercise more
deeply. The only other variable significantly affecting the probability of making an error
is the subject’s age, with the probability of deviating from theory increasing by 0.2% with
each additional year. None of the other respondent characteristics significantly affected
the probability of committing a deviation, nor did the number of individuals in a
particular experimental session.
Turning now to the DC elicitation format, those in the V1 treatment are 13.9%
more likely to deviate from theory relative to the plurality group. The probability of
deviating decreases in this format by 1.3% for every dollar increase in the difference
between earnings of the two options. Older respondents are again more likely to deviate
from theory in the DC format, as the probability increases by 0.4% for each additional
year. None of the explanatory variables significantly impact the probability of deviating
from theory in the TC elicitation format.
To further examine evidence of hypothetical and status quo bias, choice models
were run for all six treatments. Mixed logit models were used to account for
heterogeneity of preferences, repeated questions per subject, and to relax the restrictive
independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption (IIA) inherent in the commonly used
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conditional logit model to analyze choice data. Following Train (2003), utility for person

n from alternative j can be described as:
~
′
U nj = β n x nj + ε nj = x nj β + x nj β n + ε nj
~
where β n = β + β n

β n is a vector of individual-specific coefficients on observed policy- and individual~
specific variables, β represents the average preferences of the sample, and β n is the

stochastic deviation of the respondent’s tastes relative to average tastes in the sample.
Instead of being fixed over individuals, these coefficients vary over respondents with
density f ( β / θ ) where θ describes the underlying parameters of the distribution (i.e.,
mean and covariance). ε nj is a random term that is iid extreme value and independent of

β n and x nj . If preferences for a particular attribute are expected to be homogeneous
~
across the sample, β n is simply assumed to be zero.

The unconditional probability is found by integrating the logit probability over the
distribution of the random parameters:

Pnj =

∫

e

∑

K

V nj ( β )

e Vnk ( β )
k =1

f (β / θ )d β

~
Since β n is common over each alternative and individual-specific, the model accounts for

the panel structure of the data where the same respondent answers several choice
questions.35 This capability of the model is important since it is reasonable to believe that

35

A sequence of choices by the same individual is taken into account by simply including the product of
logit probabilities over an individual’s choice sets in the likelihood function.
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choices made by the same individual will be influenced by common unobservable
factors. The model also relaxes the assumption of the independence of irrelevant
alternatives inherent in other logit models. Because the probability of choosing a
particular alternative involves the integration over the density of the parameters, the ratio
of probabilities for any two alternatives will depend on the attributes of all alternatives in
the choice set. Consequently, more realistic substitution patterns can be generated in this
model. To create a mixed logit model, the analyst specifies a distribution for the
variables that are thought to vary across the sample, and also chooses which parameters
should be correlated, if any. Significance of the estimated standard deviation of a random
parameter indicates that unobserved heterogeneity is present in the sample. Conversely,
if the estimated standard deviation is insignificant, preferences for the attribute can be
assumed to be homogeneous.
Because induced values for the Red and Blue goods were uniformly distributed
among subjects, these coefficients were allowed to be random with a uniform
distribution. The constant coefficient, which represents an “action” alternative as
opposed to the status quo, was allowed to vary randomly with a normal distribution.
Socioeconomic factors that might impact status quo bias were allowed to interact with the
mean of the constant term. Several specifications were attempted, but only age and male
were found to be significant when interacted with the constant. Evidence of status quo
bias would then be manifested in the signs and significance of the constant term and its
interactions. Results of the mixed logit models are presented in Table 2.6. In five of the
six treatments none of the socioeconomic factors seem to impact any bias toward the
status quo, and the constant term has an insignificant mean coefficient and standard
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Table 2.6 Mixed Logit Models

Constant
Red
Blue
Cost
Constant*Age
Constant*Male

DCP
-9.976
(13.609)
7.950***
(3.105)
6.652***
(2.292)
-3.141***
(0.891)
0.292
(0.464)
1.714
(1.922)

DCV1
DCV2
TCP
-2.689
-0.056
32.832
(7.501)
(4.373)
(31.675)
3.380*** 4.191*** 11.772***
(1.096)
(1.063)
(4.384)
3.466*** 3.397*** 12.645**
(0.907)
(0.680)
(6.123)
-1.172** -1.146*
-6.295**
(0.504)
(0.607)
(3.157)
0.052
-0.159
-1.945
(0.367)
(0.221)
(1.533)
0.111
1.562
-0.639
(1.308)
(1.250)
(4.199)

Standard Deviation of random parameters
Constant
0.086
1.474
0.011
(24.942)
(1.223)
(46.282)
Red
0.092
1.576
0.010
(40.913)
(3.477)
(57.678)
Blue
5.638**
3.463** 2.563***
(2.424)
(1.604)
(0.848)
Model Statistics
Log-Likelihood
Number of
choice sets
Likelihood ratio
index

TCV1
-37.658***
(13.524)
15.766***
(3.515)
8.166***
(2.520)
-4.474***
(1.659)
0.684*
(0.409)
11.106***
(4.224)

TCV2
13.346
(10.834)
7.064***
(2.325)
6.230***
(1.437)
-3.161**
(1.289)
-0.535
(0.466)
-2.808
(2.096)

1.003
(5.142)
15.296
(11.066)
9.146***
(3.427)

5.446
(5.320)
15.557***
(4.830)
8.712***
(3.108)

1.092
(2.946)
6.539**
(2.944)
4.085***
(1.505)

-64.401
204

-82.308
185

-74.837
186

-75.588
193

-85.390
180

-100.176
192

0.524

0.325

0.390

0.635

0.557

0.514

Standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote parameter is statistically different from
zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 500 Halton draws were used for
each model. DCP = Dichotomous Choice Plurality Provision Rule; DCV1 = Dichotomous
Choice Vague Provision Rule; DCV2 = Dichotomous Choice Vague with Regulator Provision
Rule; TCP = Trichotomous Choice Plurality Provision Rule; TCV1 = Trichotomous Choice
Vague Provision Rule; TCV2 = Trichotomous Choice Vague with Regulator Provision Rule.
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deviation. There is some evidence of status quo bias in the TCV1 treatment as seen by
the significant negative constant coefficient, which is somewhat mitigated by the positive
coefficients on the interaction terms with age and male. However, status quo bias does
appear to be affected by elicitation mechanism. Several questions in both formats had
zero spread with the status quo option, meaning that the respondent would be indifferent
between the two options if maximizing his earnings. Examining the frequency of the
status quo choice leads to interesting findings between the two formats. In every single
instance where the subject was indifferent in a DC treatment, the subject chose the status
quo. However, those subjects in TC treatments tended to randomize equally when faced
with such a question.36 Further research is needed to determine how respondents view
these formats and if different decision heuristics might arise according to the number of
options presented.
Finally, incentive compatibility is tested by comparing the experimental choice
models with constructed choice models predicted by theory where subjects choose to
maximize their earnings. Choice experiments can calculate the marginal willingness to
pay for each attribute if a payment attribute is included in the choice set. Marginal
willingness to pay for Red and Blue goods under empirical and theoretical treatments is
presented in Table 2.7. Distributions around the median estimates were constructed
according to the numerical resampling procedure described by Krinsky and Robb (1986).
To determine if responses are demand revealing, these distributions were compared using
the complete combinatorial convolution approach of Poe et al (2005). Table 2.8 presents

36

A Fisher exact test cannot reject the hypothesis that the choice between status quo and action options that
have equal earnings in the TC treatments is purely random (p = 0.445).
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Table 2.7 Empirical and Theoretical Marginal WTP ($)
Experimental

Theory

Red

Blue

Red

Blue

DCP

2.50
(0.588 – 4.945)

2.10
(0.839 – 3.747)

2.35
(1.651 – 3.620)

2.06
(1.574 – 3.197)

DCV1

2.85
(1.008 – 10.643)

2.92
(1.453 – 10.434)

2.13
(1.449 – 3.510)

2.13
(1.544 – 3.791)

DCV2

3.44
2.82
(-9.560 – 18.898) (-7.378 – 14.882)

2.87
(1.905 – 5.131)

2.35
(1.689 – 4.379)

TCP

1.81
(-0.854 – 5.968)

1.98
(-0.312 – 4.808)

2.44
(2.046 – 3.962)

2.02
(1.316 – 4.041)

TCV1

3.53
(2.507 – 8.073)

1.81
(1.229 – 3.464)

2.38
(1.977 – 3.756)

2.02
(1.601 – 3.109)

TCV2

2.22
(1.275 – 5.091)

1.93
(1.097 – 6.985)

2.37
(1.888 – 3.771)

2.04
(1.616 – 3.128)

95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. DCP = Dichotomous Choice Plurality Provision
Rule; DCV1 = Dichotomous Choice Vague Provision Rule; DCV2 = Dichotomous Choice Vague
with Regulator Provision Rule; TCP = Trichotomous Choice Plurality Provision Rule; TCV1 =
Trichotomous Choice Vague Provision Rule; TCV2 = Trichotomous Choice Vague with
Regulator Provision Rule.
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Table 2.8 Comparing Empirical and Theoretical WTP distributions
Treatment

Red

Blue

DCP

0.454

0.489

DCV1

0.271

0.228

DCV2

0.372

0.372

TCP

0.768

0.532

TCV1

0.664

0.669

TCV2

0.604

0.555

Entries in table provide the p-value derived by Poe et al (2005) of the hypothesis that the
difference between the experimentally and theoretically generated estimates of willingness to pay
is zero. DCP = Dichotomous Choice Plurality Provision Rule; DCV1 = Dichotomous Choice
Vague Provision Rule; DCV2 = Dichotomous Choice Vague with Regulator Provision Rule; TCP
= Trichotomous Choice Plurality Provision Rule; TCV1 = Trichotomous Choice Vague Provision
Rule; TCV2 = Trichotomous Choice Vague with Regulator Provision Rule.
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the test statistic that is comparable to a p-value of the hypothesis that the difference
between the experimentally and theoretically generated estimates of willingness to pay is
zero. As all test statistics cannot be rejected at any significance level, there is no
evidence of incentive incompatibility. While some treatments result in a higher rate of
deviations from theory than others, all appear to be demand revealing.

2.5 Conclusion

This study provides a test of the incentive compatibility of choice experiments,
which represents a promising new method for valuing nonmarket goods. The success of
choice experiments as an alternative to contingent valuation depends on its ability to
yield demand-revealing responses. Theoretical evidence demonstrates that under certain
plausible beliefs the trichotomous choice framework can be incentive compatible.
Specifically, if the survey respondent is relatively uninformed regarding the support each
option might garner within the population, he will have the incentive to answer truthfully,
even under the vague provision rules. Many choice experiment surveys describe
nonmarket goods that are relatively unfamiliar to respondents, so this belief structure may
characterize numerous applications. In order to assess the likelihood of truthful
responses, researchers must include debriefing questions in a choice experiment survey to
ascertain previous knowledge of the good in question and the respondent’s belief
regarding relative support for the good in the population and the plausibility that the
relevant agency will provide the good.
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As opposed to previous tests of the incentive properties of choice experiments, this
study more closely mimics field applications by including a consequential experimental
design. Previous tests have in general compared real responses with a purely
hypothetical question in which respondents had zero probability of influencing the actual
provision of the good. As Carson, Groves, and Machina (2000) have shown, a necessary
condition for incentive compatibility is that the survey is consequential. Field
applications of choice experiments, however, generally include language stating that
responses will be considered in the policymaking process. To incorporate
consequentiality, this study includes vague provision rule treatments in an induced value
laboratory setting that lead respondents to believe they have input in the provision of the
public good, although this influence is more uncertain than the referendum provision rule
found in CV applications.
The empirical evidence gathered indicates that choice experiments with
trichotomous options and repeated choice sets can be incentive compatible under
reasonable assumptions regarding the distribution of preferences over options. While the
induced-value design of the experiment in this paper controlled for many potential
sources of status quo bias such as cost uncertainty, plausibility of implementation and
other respondent beliefs, differences in the rate of deviations from theory still exist
among treatments. An interesting finding is the occurrence of fewer errors in the
trichotomous choice formats relative to the dichotomous choice formats, and the
tendency of dichotomous choice subjects to choose the status quo. Assuming the
cognitive task involved is simpler in the dichotomous choice context, further research is
needed to discover why respondents might employ different decision heuristics when
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answering trichotomous choice versus dichotomous choice questions. Further research
will also address situations where the cost of provision is uncertain.
An important implication of this study is evidence that the choice experiment
referendum format results in fewer deviations from theory than similarly constructed
referendum CV responses. This suggests that CV applications may be improved by
adopting the attribute-based CE format for two options.
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Appendix A. SAS Code

%macro where;
bad = (x5 & x1 = 2) + (x5 & x1 = 3);
%mend;
%mktex(3 3 3 3 3, n=3*3*3*3*3, seed = 238, restrictions = where)
data final(drop=i);
set design end=eof;
retain f1-f2 1 f3 0;
output;
if eof then do;
array x[8] x1-x5 f1-f3;
do i = 1 to 8; x[i] = i le 5 or i eq 8; end;
output;
end;
run;
%choiceff(data=final, model=class(x1-x5), nsets=18, maxiter=100,
flags=f1-f3, beta=zero);
%mktblock(data=best, nalts=3, nblocks=3, factors=x1-x5)
data key;
input visibility days gasoline IM Electricity;
format IM dollar5.0;
format Electricity dollar5.0;
datalines;
1 16 0 0 0
7 24 4 20 72
15 32 8 50 144
;
%mktlab (data=blocked, key = key);
Variable Mapping:
X1 : visibility
X2: days
X3: gasoline
X4: IM
X5: electricity
proc print; run;
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Appendix B. Example of Knoxville Survey Instrument

Air Quality in the Knoxville Metropolitan Area
And Your Household

UNION

ANDERSON
KNOX

JEFFERSON

SEVIER
LOUDON
BLOUNT
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Knoxville Metropolitan Area Air Quality Survey

Introduction

The University of Tennessee is undertaking a research project to help policymakers better
understand the value of air quality in the Knoxville metropolitan area. We would like
your opinion on the quality of air in this area, and if policies should be undertaken to
address this issue. The major goal of this study is to provide accurate information to
policymakers.
We would be grateful if you would take about 10-15 minutes to complete the attached
survey that asks you to compare different policy options. This survey should be
completed by an adult over eighteen years of age who participates in deciding household
expenses. Your address was chosen at random. Your participation in this survey is
completely voluntary. Should you choose to participate in our survey, your answers will
remain confidential.
If you would like to enter a random drawing for one of ten $50 Wal-Mart gift certificates,
please fill in the optional form at the end of the survey. This form will be immediately
separated from returned, completed questionnaires. The University of Tennessee will
release no information as to how any particular survey was answered.
Thank you in advance for taking the time to fill out and return this survey.
If you would like us to send you a copy of the results of the study after it is completed, or
if you have questions or comments contact:
Jill Collins
Department of Economics
College of Business Administration
505A Stokely Management Center
University of Tennessee
Knoxville, TN 37996-0550
(865) 974-4193
jphilli9@utk.edu
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Knoxville Metro Area Air Quality Survey, Block 1
SECTION A: General Issues

To start off, we would like to find out what you think about some general issues facing
the Knoxville metropolitan area.
Question 1
Please circle the number on a scale from 1 to 5, with “1” indicating the issue is not at
all important and “5” indicating the issue is very important to you:

Not important

Very important

Improving education in TN

1

2

3

4

5

Local environmental quality

1

2

3

4

5

Homeland security issues in TN

1

2

3

4

5

Health care in TN

1

2

3

4

5

Local economy/unemployment

1

2

3

4

5

Question 2
One of the issues mentioned in Question 1 was “Local environmental quality.”
Please circle the number on a scale from 1 to 5, with “1” indicating not at all
important and “5” indicating very important to you:

Not important

Very important

Reducing water pollution

1

2

3

4

5

Reducing air pollution

1

2

3

4

5

Preventing global warming

1

2

3

4

5

Preserving natural areas

1

2

3

4

5
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SECTION B: Air Quality Issues in the Knoxville Metro Area
Ozone and Particulate Matter Emissions

In a report by the American Lung Association titled, “State of the Air: 2003,” the
Knoxville metro area (Anderson, Blount, Knox, Loudon, Sevier and Union Counties) was
listed as having the 9th worst air quality in the nation. Indeed, since 1999, the Knoxville
metro area has had, on average, 40 days per year when the air quality was considered
“unhealthy” by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). On these “unhealthy” days,
the Knoxville area violated the EPA standard for a regulated pollutant. EPA sets these air
quality standards to protect human health, using the best available scientific information.
Violations occur in the Knoxville area because of excess ground-level ozone and
particulate matter.
Ground-level Ozone

Unlike ozone in the upper atmosphere that protects against the sun’s ultraviolet rays,
ground-level ozone is a pollutant that has negative effects on health.
What is ground-level ozone and what causes it?

•
•
•

Ground-level ozone is an airborne pollutant that occurs mostly in warmer,
summer months
Caused by a reaction between sunlight and two pollutants: nitrogen oxides and
hydrocarbons
Major sources are: motor vehicle exhaust, coal-fired power plants, industrial
emissions, gasoline vapors, and chemical solvents

What are the effects of ground-level ozone?

•
•
•
•
•

Wheezing, coughing, breathing difficulties during outdoor activities
Aggravated asthma
Increased susceptibility to respiratory illnesses such as bronchitis and pneumonia
Children, the elderly, and people with respiratory difficulties are most susceptible,
as well as those who spend a lot of time outdoors
Repeated exposure may cause permanent lung damage
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Particulate Matter

Particulate matter is the other major source of air quality problems in the Knoxville area.
What is particulate matter and what causes it?

•
•

Particulate matter are suspended particles in the air including road dust, diesel
soot, wood smoke, fly ash, and sulfate aerosols
Major sources are: coal-fired power plants, industrial boilers, diesel and gaspowered vehicles, and wood stoves

What are the effects of particulate matter?

•
•
•
•
•

Aggravated asthma
Coughing and difficult or painful breathing
Chronic bronchitis
Reduced visibility (haze)
Premature death

SECTION C: Policy Options for Improving Air Quality

Over the next few years, air quality will improve because of actions already taken by the
federal government. These measures will likely improve local visibility by about one
mile, and reduce the number of unhealthy days in the area from 40 to 24 unhealthy days
per year. However, the Knoxville area is still projected to violate the EPA standards even
with these national measures in place. Local air quality officials are currently deciding
what additional pollution reduction measures are needed to meet the EPA air quality
standards. Possible pollution reduction measures include:

•
•
•
•

Vehicle inspection and maintenance
Different blends of gasoline and diesel fuel
Lower speed limits on rural interstates
Additional regulations on power plants

We may need to undertake several of these actions to meet the EPA standards. As a
result of these measures, your household may realize environmental and health benefits
but at a cost to your household budget. The purpose of this survey is to find out what
households think about some of these additional pollution reduction options.
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Please consider the following benefits and costs associated with implementing one or
more of these policy options:
POLICY BENEFITS
Improvement in Visibility

Currently the annual average visibility in the Great Smoky Mountains is 25 miles.
Average visibility would be 93 miles under natural conditions with no pollution.
Visibility is mostly affected by levels of particulate matter. If additional pollution
reduction measures are undertaken by the Knoxville area, visibility could improve by up
to 15 miles.
Improvement in Healthy Air Quality Days

From 1999 – 2003, the Knoxville metro area averaged approximately 40 unhealthy air
quality days per year. Most of the unhealthy days in the Knoxville area have been due to
ozone pollution. If the Knoxville area takes additional measures to reduce pollution, the
number of healthy air quality days could be improved by up to 32 days, which would
make the average number of unhealthy days about 8 days per year.
POLICY COSTS
Increase in Gasoline Price

Some pollution reduction measures would require cleaner-burning fuel such as
reformulated gasoline. Reformulated gasoline meets the power requirements of all
gasoline vehicles, but costs more to produce. Other measures that could affect the price
of gasoline would be the use of special equipment at gas stations to recover vapor
emissions. The possible range of price increases per gallon of gasoline is from zero (no
actions relating to gasoline are taken) to 8 additional cents per gallon. For a small car
averaging 22 miles per gallon and driven 12,000 miles per year, a 4-cent price increase
would cost about $22 per year, while an 8-cent increase would cost $44 per year. For a
large vehicle averaging 12 miles per gallon and driven 12,000 miles per year, a 4-cent
price increase would cost $40 per year, while an 8-cent increase would cost $80 per year.
Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance

A vehicle inspection and maintenance program would test emissions of all registered
passenger cars and trucks each year. If a vehicle fails the emissions test, it would need to
be repaired and re-tested before the owner could renew registration. The yearly
inspection fee is $20, and if a car fails, the average repair cost is $145. Most vehicles do
not need to be repaired each year. The range of costs per vehicle for this program is from
zero (no vehicle inspection program) to $50 per year (average repair costs over the
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lifetime of the vehicle plus the yearly inspection fee).
Increase in Electricity Bill

Power plants emit pollutants that contribute to both ozone and particulate matter
pollution. To reduce emissions, power plants may need to purchase control equipment,
which in turn could lead to increases in the monthly electricity bill for your household.
Possible increases in a household’s electricity bill range from zero (no additional controls
are required of power plants) to $12 extra per month.

SECTION D: Your Preferred Policy Options

This section will present various combinations of the benefits and costs of achieving air
quality goals in the Knoxville metro area. Over the next six questions, you are asked to
choose the option that you most prefer. Remember, if a particular policy option is
implemented, you would be required to pay the amount identified by the cost attributes,
and will have less to spend on other goods and services.
The “No Local Action” option refers to the situation where no additional pollution
reduction measures are taken by the Knoxville area, and the area will remain in violation
of the EPA standards. Because the area will be violating EPA standards, the Knoxville
area may also lose federal highway funds and future business development under the “No
Local Action” option.
Please note that the number of healthy days can be improved without improving visibility
because of the different effects of ozone and particulate matter.
While the following six questions may seem similar, your responses to all questions are
extremely important for our policy analysis.
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Sample Question
Suppose the following three policies were the only options available for achieving air
quality goals in the Knoxville metro area. Please indicate which policy you prefer
by checking one of the boxes below.
Local Policy A

Local Policy B

Policy Benefits and Costs

Policy C:
No Local Action

Visibility improvement

1 mile

7 miles

1 mile

Healthy days improvement

32 days

16 days

16 days

Gasoline price increase per gallon

0 cents

8 cents

0 cents

Vehicle inspection cost per year

$50

$20

$0

Increase in electric bill per year

$144

$72

$0

I would choose:

Policy A

Policy B

Policy C

If you choose Policy A, you are indicating that you would prefer the policy with these
outcomes:

•
•
•
•
•

Visibility improvement: 1 mile. Under this policy option, average annual
visibility would improve from 25 miles to 26 miles.
Healthy days improvement: 32. Under this policy option, the number of healthy
days would improve by 32 days. Instead of 40 unhealthy days per year, there
would only be 8 unhealthy days per year on average.
Gasoline price increase per gallon: 0 cents. This policy option does not include
changes to gasoline, so gasoline prices would be unaffected.
Vehicle inspection cost per year: $50. Emissions testing is a part of this policy
option. The cost represents the testing fee ($20) plus the average payment if a
vehicle fails inspection, spread out over a five-year lifetime of the vehicle ($30).
Increase in electric bill per year: $144. This policy option would require power
plants to install additional equipment, and lead to electricity price increases of $12
per month, or $144 per year.

Policy B has a similar interpretation, while Policy C represents the “No Local Action”
scenario where benefits occur because of actions already taken by the federal
government. For this reason Policy C has no new costs to households, but the area may
lose future business development as a result of violating air quality standards.
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Question 3
Suppose the following three policies were the only options available for achieving air
quality goals in the Knoxville metro area. Please indicate which policy you prefer
by checking one of the boxes below.
Local Policy A

Local Policy B

Policy Benefits and Costs

Policy C:
No Local Action

Visibility improvement

7 miles

15 miles

1 mile

Healthy days improvement

32 days

24 days

16 days

Gasoline price increase per gallon

0 cents

8 cents

0 cents

Vehicle inspection cost per year

$20

$0

$0

Increase in electric bill per year

$144

$72

$0

I would choose:

Policy A

Policy B

Policy C

Question 4
Suppose the following three policies were the only options available for achieving air
quality goals in the Knoxville metro area. Please indicate which policy you prefer
by checking one of the boxes below.
Local Policy A

Local Policy B

Policy C:
No Local Action

Policy Benefits and Costs

Visibility improvement

1 mile

15 miles

1 mile

Healthy days improvement

32 days

24 days

16 days

Gasoline price increase per gallon

4 cents

0 cents

0 cents

Vehicle inspection cost per year

$0

$20

$0

Increase in electric bill per year

$72

$144

$0

I would choose:

Policy A
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Policy B

Policy C

Question 5
Suppose the following three policies were the only options available for achieving air
quality goals in the Knoxville metro area. Please indicate which policy you prefer
by checking one of the boxes below.
Local Policy A

Local Policy B

Policy Benefits and Costs

Policy C:
No Local Action

Visibility improvement

15 miles

7 miles

1 mile

Healthy days improvement

32 days

32 days

16 days

Gasoline price increase per gallon

4 cents

0 cents

0 cents

Vehicle inspection cost per year

$0

$20

$0

Increase in electric bill per year

$144

$72

$0

I would choose:

Policy A

Policy B

Policy C

Question 6
Suppose the following three policies were the only options available for achieving air
quality goals in the Knoxville metro area. Please indicate which policy you prefer
by checking one of the boxes below.
Local Policy A

Local Policy B

Policy C:
No Local Action

Policy Benefits and Costs

Visibility improvement

15 miles

1 mile

1 mile

Healthy days improvement

16 days

32 days

16 days

Gasoline price increase per gallon

8 cents

4 cents

0 cents

Vehicle inspection cost per year

$0

$50

$0

Increase in electric bill per year

$72

$0

$0

I would choose:

Policy A
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Policy B

Policy C

Question 7
Suppose the following three policies were the only options available for achieving air
quality goals in the Knoxville metro area. Please indicate which policy you prefer
by checking one of the boxes below.
Local Policy A

Local Policy B

Policy C:
No Local Action

Policy Benefits and Costs

Visibility improvement

15 miles

1 mile

1 mile

Healthy days improvement

16 days

32 days

16 days

Gasoline price increase per gallon

0 cents

4 cents

0 cents

Vehicle inspection cost per year

$20

$0

$0

Increase in electric bill per year

$72

$0

$0

I would choose:

Policy A

Policy B

Policy C

Question 8
Suppose the following three policies were the only options available for achieving air
quality goals in the Knoxville metro area. Please indicate which policy you prefer
by checking one of the boxes below.
Local Policy A

Local Policy B

Policy C:
No Local Action

Policy Benefits and Costs

Visibility improvement

7 miles

1 mile

1 mile

Healthy days improvement

32 days

32 days

16 days

Gasoline price increase per gallon

0 cents

4 cents

0 cents

Vehicle inspection cost per year

$50

$20

$0

Increase in electric bill per year

$144

$72

$0

I would choose:

Policy A
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Policy B

Policy C

SECTION E: About You and Your Household

In this section of the questionnaire, we would like to ask you a few questions about
yourself and your family background to make sure the people we are surveying are
representative of the Knoxville metro area population. All answers will be kept in strict
confidentiality.
Question 9
(a) Have you read any news articles within the past year about Knoxville’s air
quality?

Yes
No
(b) If you responded “yes,” did the news articles give a favorable or unfavorable
view of air quality in the Knoxville metro area?

Favorable
Unfavorable
(c) In your opinion, were the news articles you read accurate?

Yes
No
Question 10
(a) Including yourself, how many people live in your household? ____________
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(b) How many of these people (including yourself) are members of your family?
______
(c) How many of these people (including yourself) are 16 years of age or older?
_______
(d) How many of these people are 6 years of age or younger? ____________
Question 11
How old are you? ____________ years old.
Question 12
What is your gender?

Male
Female
Question 13
What is the highest level of education you have completed?

Elementary or some High School
High School Graduate/GED
Trade or Vocational Certification
Some College/Associate Degree
College Graduate
Post-Graduate Degree
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Question 14
If you are a registered voter, with which political party do you most identify?

Democratic
Republican
Green Party
Independent
Libertarian
Question 15
What is your race?

Asian
Black
Hispanic
White
Other (please specify) ________________________________
Question 16
What is your current marital status?

Married

Divorced

Single

Widowed
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Question 17
(a) Because income is often a very good indicator of perspectives on outdoor
recreation and perspectives on community improvements, we would like to ask you
a sensitive question. Please remember your name will not be used in any way
relating to your responses. What was your approximate 2003 household income,
including income from interest and dividend income and/or retirement income
before taxes?

Less than $10,000
$10,000 to $19,999
$20,000 to $29,999
$30,000 to $39,999
$40,000 to $49,999
$50,000 to $59,999
$60,000 to $69,999
$70,000 to $79,999
$80,000 to $89,999
$90,000 to $99,999
More than $100,000
(b) Was this yearly income unusual in any way?

No
Yes, unusually high
Yes, unusually low
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Question 18
Please describe your employment status.

Employed full time

Unemployed, between jobs

Employed part time

Full time student

Retired

Question 19
Do you now, or have you ever belonged to a group that promotes environmental
causes?

Yes
No
Question 20
(a) Does anyone in your household have asthma or other respiratory diseases such
as Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD)?

Yes
No
(b) Do you know someone outside your household in the Knoxville area who has
asthma or other respiratory diseases?

Yes
No
Question 21
Have you ever lived in an area that requires vehicle emissions testing?

Yes
No
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Question 22
(a) How many passenger cars does your household own/lease? ____________
(b) How many sport utility vehicles or trucks does your household own/lease?
________
(c) Do you own any vehicles that are at least five years old?

Yes
No
Question 23
Approximately how many miles do you typically drive per year? ___________ miles
Question 24
(a) Have you visited the Great Smoky Mountain National Park within the last year?

Yes
No
(b) If you answered “Yes,” approximately how many times did you visit last year?

_______ number of visits
Question 25
How long do you plan on living in the Knoxville metro area?
______________________
Question 26
How much is your typical electricity bill per month?
_____________________________
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Question 27
Which policy benefit do you think is more important?

Visibility improvement
Healthy days improvement
Question 28
Please rank the policy payment methods from “1” to “3,” with “1” representing the
method you would most support if placed on a ballot:

Vehicle inspection and maintenance
Electricity bill
Gasoline price

Your comments will be appreciated, either here or in a separate
envelope.

All your answers will be kept strictly confidential
Thank you very much for your assistance. We greatly appreciate your
effort and time.
Please return your questionnaire in the enclosed envelope to:
Jill Collins
Department of Economics
The University of Tennessee
505A Stokely Management Center
Knoxville TN 37996
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Appendix C. Sample Selection Bias

Because of the low response rate to the survey, an analysis of sample selection
was attempted using a two-stage, Heckman type selection model. The survey was mailed
to a random sample of Knoxville area households in the hope that respondents would
accurately reflect the preferences of the entire population. If the only differences
between respondents and the underlying population are based on observed factors such as
age, gender, education, etc., then the model can provide consistent estimates of
willingness to pay by simply using the population metrics. If, on the other hand,
preferences of survey respondents systematically differ from non-respondents based on
unobservable factors, estimates of willingness to pay will be biased (Cameron et al,
1999).
The bias from sample selection arises from an incidentally truncated sample.
Suppose that an individual derives utility from completing the survey (net of any costs
associated with survey completion) and that this utility is determined by a vector of
observable factors w and a stochastic component, u. This propensity to respond to the
survey cannot be observed by the analyst, who can only observe if the survey is
completed. Responses are only gathered for individuals whose latent net utility from
completing the survey is greater than zero.
Let z * n = θ ′wn + u n describe the latent utility function of individual n that also
serves as the model selection equation. Since z * n is unobservable, the binary outcome,

zn, is equal to one if the survey is returned and zero otherwise. Following Heckman
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(1979), this selection equation can be estimated with a probit model, assuming that un ∼
N(0,1). The probability that zn =1 is Φ (θ ′wn ) and the probability that zn =0 is 1- Φ (θ ′wn )
where Φ (θ ′wn ) describes the cumulative density function for a variable with a normal
distribution evaluated at θ ′wn . Let yn represent the primary outcome of interest (i.e., the
choice of policy option in the current study) that is observed only if zn =1. Following
Greene (2005), if y n = β ′x n + ε n and un and ε n ∼ bivariate normal [0,0,1, σ ε , ρ ], then
E [y z n = 1] = β ′x n + ρσ ε λ n (θ ′wn ) and Var [y z n = 1] = σ ε [1 − ρ 2δ n (θ ′wn )] ] where λ n
2

(the inverse mills ratio) =

φ (θ ′wn )
and δ n = λ n (λ n − θ ′wn ) .
Φ (θ ′wn )

Essentially the bias from ignoring the issue of sample selection results from
omitting a relevant variable, the inverse mills ratio. The Heckman two-stage model
includes the inverse mills ratio constructed from the selection equation as an additional
variable in the second stage linear regression model to correct for any selection bias.
However, this model is not readily applicable to a second stage equation with non-normal
errors such as the mixed logit specification. Following Hellerstein (2006), instead of
assuming that un is correlated with the extreme value error of each alternative, this model
~
assumes that un and β n (the stochastic, individual and observation-specific component of

a random parameter) have a bivariate normal distribution. A random parameter in the
two-stage mixed logit model is therefore modeled as
∧
~
∧ 2

β = β + β n ρ λn + β n 1 − ρ δ n


∧

∧
~

∧


nor
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~ˆ
where βˆ is the estimated value of the mean of the random parameter, β n is the
estimated standard deviation of the random parameter, ρ̂ is the estimated correlation
~
between un and β n , nor is a random number drawn from the standard normal distribution

and λn and δ n are given by the first stage estimation. While this model can correct for
correlation among the unobservable factors in the selection equation and in the stochastic
elements of the random parameters, it constrains the specification of the random
parameters to normal distributions in order to utilize the bivariate normal distribution.
Also, in a model with multiple random parameters, the correlations between un and the
stochastic element of each random parameter are assumed to be independent.
To estimate the model, socioeconomic characteristics were gathered on the entire
mailing sample through use of the 2000 U.S. Census at the zip code level. While the
ideal would be to have specific data on all recipients at the household level, aggregation
at the zip code level may still capture some heterogeneity of survey recipients if
neighborhoods are relatively homogenous. A total of 63 zip codes were used in the
model, with respondents distinguished from non-respondents by the completion of the
Wal-Mart raffle form returned with the completed survey (approximately 291
respondents, 72% of returned surveys, completed this form). Non-respondent zip codes
were known from the original mailing.
The vector wn includes Census zip code characteristics (see Table A.1) suggested
by Cameron et al (1999) in their selection model related to a mail survey on water-based
recreational participation within the Columbia River systems, in addition to a dummy
variable equal to one if the household resides in Knox County.
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Table A.1 Variables Used in Selection Model
Variable
White
Language isolated

Longtime resident
Long commute
College degree
Median income
Retirement income
Knox

Definition
Proportion white
Proportion language-isolated
Proportion long-term resident (at
least 5 years)
Proportion with long commute (at
least 20 minutes)
Proportion college-educated
Median household income ($000s)
Proportion with retirement income
=1 if household resides in Knox
County, 0 otherwise

Sample Mean (std. dev.)
0.90 (0.12)
0.01 (0.01)
0.94 (0.01)

0.54 (0.11)
0.22 (0.13)
37.59 (10.79)
0.18 (0.04)
0.68 (0.47)

All variables defined according to relevant zip code area.

Hellerstein’s model was run for the identified 291 respondents, assuming that un
has a bivariate normal distribution with the stochastic element of the three random
parameters: the alternative specific constant, visibility and healthy days. The Gaussbased program developed by Hellerstein is still in its initial stages of development, and
consequently only preliminary results are presented here. The first stage selection
equation is presented in Table A.2. Marginal effects are shown for ease of interpretation.
Only the presence of retirement income and Knox County residence appear to
significantly affect the probability of returning the survey. The dominant effect comes
from retirement income, with each percentage increase in the proportion of residents
receiving retirement income increasing the likelihood to respond by 49.2%. Residence in
Knox County increases the propensity to respond by 3.7%. However, the model does not
seem to provide a good fit for the data, with a likelihood ratio index of only 0.008.
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Table A.2 Selection Model Results
Variable

White
Language isolated
Longtime resident
Long commute
College degree
Median income
Retirement income
Knox
Model Statistics
Log-Likelihood
Likelihood ratio index
N

Marginal Effect
(Standard Error)
-0.057
(0.074)
-0.114
(1.325)
-0.300
(0.768)
0.099
(0.101)
0.090
(0.121)
-0.000
(0.001)
0.492**
(0.216)
0.037**
(0.017)

-864.506
0.008
2289

Dependent variable = 1 if responded to the survey, 0 otherwise. *,**, and *** denote parameter
is statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. The
likelihood ratio index provides the percentage increase in the log-likelihood function relative to
the model estimated with constants only.

Second stage results could not be obtained due to a lack of model convergence. Further
testing will be conducted with the ongoing development of the software.
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Appendix D. Trichotomous Choice Vague with Regulator Treatment
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Instructions
Welcome

This is an experiment about decision making. Funds for this research have been provided
by a grant. Please pay careful attention to the instructions. By following them carefully,
you may earn considerable money that will be paid to you in cash at the end of the
experiment.
You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the course of the
experiment. Your name will never be associated with any of your decisions. In order to
keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices to any other participant.
We have some simple yet very important rules:

•
•

Do not communicate with anyone in the room except a coordinator.
Please do not hesitate to ask questions. If you have a question, raise your hand and a
coordinator will answer it.

In this experiment we are giving you a starting balance of $7. Your earnings will
ultimately depend on two things. First, before we get to the main experiment you will go
through some examples. You will be paid by correctly performing calculations within the
context of these examples. Second, your earnings will depend on the choices that you and
the other participants make in the experiment.
We will read the instructions together; please follow along on your copy.
The Setting

In this experiment you will be presented with six choice questions. For each question you
will be asked to select among a set of options. Each option specifies an amount of two
goods that would be provided and the total cost associated with their provision. We have
labeled the two goods as Red and Blue. You value both Red and Blue goods in the sense
that they are worth money to you if provided. Others in the experiment value these goods
as well, although values differ across people.
You have all been given a Value Card that shows your per-unit value of Red and Blue
goods. In other words, your Value Card tells you how much money you receive, per unit,
when these goods are provided. Know that values differ across people so do not show
anyone your card. Using your Value Card, you will be selecting options that you prefer,
depending on how many units of Red and Blue goods are provided in each option and
how much the option costs.
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Example choice question

In the experiment you will face choice questions similar to that in the following example.
Suppose the following three options were the only options available to produce Red
and Blue goods. Please examine your Value Card and indicate which option you
prefer by checking one of the boxes below.
Option A

Option B

Option C:
Status Quo

Number of Red goods provided

3 units

2 units

1 unit

Number of Blue goods provided

1 unit

3 units

1 unit

$4

$6

$0

Total cost per person
I choose:

Option A

Option B

Option C

If you choose Option A, you are indicating that you would prefer the option with these
outcomes:
• Number of Red goods provided: 3 units.
• Number of Blue goods provided: 1 unit.
• Total cost per person: $4.
If you choose Option B, you are indicating that you would prefer the option with these
outcomes:
• Number of Red goods provided: 2 units.
• Number of Blue goods provided: 3 units.
• Total cost per person: $6.
If you choose Option C, you are indicating that you would prefer the “Status Quo”
option with these outcomes:
• Number of Red goods provided: 1 unit.
• Number of Blue goods provided: 1 unit.
• Total cost per person: $0.
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Based on your choice and the choices of the other participants, one of the options will be
implemented for everyone in the experiment. Your earnings for the implemented option
will be:
+
–
+
$

Your per-unit value of the Red good × the number of Red goods provided
Your per-unit value of the Blue good × the number of Blue goods provided
Total cost per person
Your starting balance of $7
Your earnings

Understanding Earnings Calculations
It is very important for our research that you understand how your earnings will be
determined in the experiment. We ask that you please answer the three questions below,
using the following Example Value Card. Please note that this Example Value Card is
different from the Value Card that you will use in the experiment. We will pay you $2 if
you correctly answer all questions.
EXAMPLE VALUE CARD
Your value of Red goods:

$2 per unit

Your value of Blue goods: $2 per unit

For any option that is implemented, you will:
•
Pay the cost of the option
•
Receive your value of $2 for every unit of the Red good provided
•
Receive your value of $2 for every unit of the Blue good provided
•
Receive your starting balance of $7
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Suppose the following three options were the only options available to produce Red
and Blue goods. Please examine your Example Value Card and indicate which
option you prefer by checking one of the boxes below.
Option A

Option B

Option C:
Status Quo

Number of Red goods provided

2 units

1 unit

1 unit

Number of Blue goods provided

1 unit

3 units

1 unit

$8

$6

$0

Total cost per person
I choose:

Option A

Option B

Option C

1. Suppose that Option A is implemented for the group. Using the Example Value Card,
what will your earnings be if Option A is implemented?
_______ × _______ units of Red goods

EARNINGS

+

_______ × _______ units of Blue goods

–

________ Total cost per person

+

Your starting balance of $7

$

________________

2. Now suppose that instead Option B is implemented for the group. Using the Example
Value Card, what will your earnings be if Option B is implemented?

_______ × _______ units of Red goods

EARNINGS

+

_______ × _______ units of Blue goods

–

________ Total cost per person

+

Your starting balance of $7

$

________________
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3. Finally, now suppose that instead Option C is implemented for the group. Using the
Example Value Card, what will your earnings be if Option C is implemented?
_______ × _______ units of Red goods

EARNINGS

+

_______ × _______ units of Blue goods

–

________ Total cost per person

+

Your starting balance of $7

$

________________

Please stop and wait for the coordinator to go over the calculations with you.
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Determining which Option is Implemented

Based on the option that you select and the options that others in this experiment select,
we will implement one and only one of the options for everyone in the group. We will do
this using poker chips and a bag as follows. For each person that selects Option A we will
place a white chip in the bag. For each person that selects Option B we will place a black
chip in the bag. For each person that selects Option C we will place a green chip in the
bag. In addition, the experiment coordinators will place a certain number of blue chips in
the bag. The number of blue chips the coordinators will place in the bag will equal the
number of people in the group. We will then have a volunteer pull a chip out of the bag.
The option that corresponds with the color of poker chip chosen will be implemented.
The coordinators have written down on a piece of paper the option that corresponds to a
blue chip. This will be revealed to you in the event a blue chip is drawn from the bag.
Here is an example. Suppose there are 20 people in the group. Three people select
Option A so we put 3 white chips in the bag. Seven people choose Option B so we put 7
black chips in the bag, and the rest choose Option C so we put 10 green chips in the bag.
Because there are 20 people in the group, the coordinators will put 20 blue chips in the
bag. If a white chip is drawn, Option A is implemented, if a black chip is drawn Option
B is implemented, if a green chip is drawn Option C is implemented, and finally, if a blue
chip is drawn the coordinators will reveal the option on the piece of paper that will be
implemented.
Earning money in this experiment

You will be paid for only one of the questions. After all six choice questions have been
answered, we will ask a volunteer to roll a six-sided die. The number rolled will
correspond to the question you will be paid for.
For this randomly selected question, we will use the procedure above to determine which
option is implemented. Your earnings will be calculated by subtracting the cost of the
selected option from your value of the units provided, plus your starting balance of $7.
Your value of the units provided will equal your per-unit value of the Red good
multiplied by the number of Red units provided, plus your per-unit value of the Blue
good multiplied by the number of Blue units provided.
Please note that you must pay the amount associated with the policy option that is drawn
from the bag of chips, even if you selected another option while answering the choice
question.
Just about ready…

For all six choice questions there will be a “Status Quo” option where one unit of Red
and one unit of Blue are provided at no additional cost to each person. The characteristics
of the other options will vary from one question to the next.
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For a particular Question, everyone faces the same options as you do. However, everyone
will not see the questions in the same order. Finally, keep in mind that while the
following six questions may seem similar, your responses to all questions are extremely
important since any one of the six questions may be chosen by the roll of the die.
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Question 5
Suppose the following three options were the only options available to produce Red
and Blue goods. Please examine your Value Card and indicate which option you
prefer by checking one of the boxes below.
Option A

Option B

Option C:
Status Quo

Number of Red goods provided

1 unit

2 units

1 unit

Number of Blue goods provided

3 units

1 unit

1 unit

$4

$2.50

$0

Total cost per person
I choose:

Option A

Option B

Option C

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the event that this question is selected to determine your earnings, please use the space
below to calculate your earnings.
Option implemented: _________
Your earnings based on this implemented Option:
_______ × _______ units of Red goods
+

_______ × _______ units of Blue goods

–

________ Total cost per person

+

Your starting balance of $7

EARNINGS $

________________
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Question 2
Suppose the following three options were the only options available to produce Red
and Blue goods. Please examine your Value Card and indicate which option you
prefer by checking one of the boxes below.
Option A

Option B

Option C:
Status Quo

Number of Red goods provided

2 units

1 unit

1 unit

Number of Blue goods provided

1 unit

3 units

1 unit

$4

$2.50

$0

Total cost per person
I choose:

Option A

Option B

Option C

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the event that this question is selected to determine your earnings, please use the space
below to calculate your earnings.
Option implemented: _________
Your earnings based on this implemented Option:
_______ × _______ units of Red goods
+

_______ × _______ units of Blue goods

–

________ Total cost per person

+

Your starting balance of $7

EARNINGS $

________________
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Question 3
Suppose the following three options were the only options available to produce Red
and Blue goods. Please examine your Value Card and indicate which option you
prefer by checking one of the boxes below.
Option A

Option B

Option C:
Status Quo

Number of Red goods provided

1 unit

2 units

1 unit

Number of Blue goods provided

3 units

3 units

1 unit

Total cost per person

$2.50

$4

$0

I choose:

Option A

Option B

Option C

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the event that this question is selected to determine your earnings, please use the space
below to calculate your earnings.
Option implemented: _________
Your earnings based on this implemented Option:
_______ × _______ units of Red goods
+

_______ × _______ units of Blue goods

–

________ Total cost per person

+

Your starting balance of $7

EARNINGS $

________________
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Question 6
Suppose the following three options were the only options available to produce Red
and Blue goods. Please examine your Value Card and indicate which option you
prefer by checking one of the boxes below.
Option A

Option B

Option C:
Status Quo

Number of Red goods provided

2 units

2 units

1 unit

Number of Blue goods provided

1 unit

3 units

1 unit

Total cost per person

$2.50

$4

$0

I choose:

Option A

Option B

Option C

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the event that this question is selected to determine your earnings, please use the space
below to calculate your earnings.
Option implemented: _________
Your earnings based on this implemented Option:
_______ × _______ units of Red goods
+

_______ × _______ units of Blue goods

–

________ Total cost per person

+

Your starting balance of $7

EARNINGS $

________________
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Question 1
Suppose the following three options were the only options available to produce Red
and Blue goods. Please examine your Value Card and indicate which option you
prefer by checking one of the boxes below.
Option A

Option B

Option C:
Status Quo

Number of Red goods provided

2 units

2 units

1 unit

Number of Blue goods provided

3 units

1 unit

1 unit

$4

$2.50

$0

Total cost per person
I choose:

Option A

Option B

Option C

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the event that this question is selected to determine your earnings, please use the space
below to calculate your earnings.
Option implemented: _________
Your earnings based on this implemented Option:
_______ × _______ units of Red goods
+

_______ × _______ units of Blue goods

–

________ Total cost per person

+

Your starting balance of $7

EARNINGS $

________________
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Question 4
Suppose the following three options were the only options available to produce Red
and Blue goods. Please examine your Value Card and indicate which option you
prefer by checking one of the boxes below.
Option A

Option B

Option C:
Status Quo

Number of Red goods provided

2 units

1 unit

1 unit

Number of Blue goods provided

1 unit

3 units

1 unit

Total cost per person

$2.50

$4

$0

I choose:

Option A

Option B

Option C

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the event that this question is selected to determine your earnings, please use the space
below to calculate your earnings.
Option implemented: _________
Your earnings based on this implemented Option:
_______ × _______ units of Red goods
+

_______ × _______ units of Blue goods

–

________ Total cost per person

+

Your starting balance of $7

EARNINGS $

________________
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QUESTIONNAIRE
Please answer the following questions. This is for our information only and your
participation is optional. Your responses will only be associated with your subject
identification number and will in no way affect your earnings.

1. What is your age? ____________
2. What is your gender? (circle one)

Male

Female

3. What is your major? ______________________________________
4. What are you classified as for the current or upcoming semester? (circle one)
Freshman

Sophomore

Junior

Master’s Student

Law Student

Doctoral Student

Senior

Other ____________
5. What is your student status for the current semester? (circle one)
Full-time student

Part-time student (taking fewer than 12 hours/sem)

Not a student

Other (please specify)

6. How many economics courses have you taken at the university level? (include this
term) _____________________
7. Have you previously participated in an economics experiment? (circle one) YES NO
8. On a scale of 1 (“poorly understood) to 5 (“well understood”), please indicate how
well you understood the experiment instructions:
2
3
4
5
(circle one) 1
9. Have you ever voted in a state or national election (either in the U.S. or in your home
country)? (circle one) YES NO
10. In your previous economics classes, have you studied the economics of public
YES NO
goods? (circle one)
11. How would you best describe your current employment situation? (circle one)
Full-time employment outside of the university
Part-time employment outside of the university
Student only
Work at the university/research assistantship
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